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On the Efficiency of Classical and Quantum Secure
Function Evaluation
Severin Winkler and Ju¨rg Wullschleger
Abstract—We provide bounds on the efficiency of secure one-
sided output two-party computation of arbitrary finite functions
from trusted distributed randomness in the statistical case. From
these results we derive bounds on the efficiency of protocols
that use different variants of OT as a black-box. When applied
to implementations of OT, these bounds generalize most known
results to the statistical case. Our results hold in particular for
transformations between a finite number of primitives and for
any error. In the second part we study the efficiency of quantum
protocols implementing OT. While most classical lower bounds
for perfectly secure reductions of OT to distributed randomness
still hold in the quantum setting, we present a statistically
secure protocol that violates these bounds by an arbitrarily large
factor. We then prove a weaker lower bound that does hold in
the statistical quantum setting and implies that even quantum
protocols cannot extend OT. Finally, we present two lower bounds
for reductions of OT to commitments and a protocol based on
string commitments that is optimal with respect to both of these
bounds.
Index Terms—Unconditional security, oblivious transfer, lower
bounds, two-party computation, quantum cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure multi-party computation allows two or more distrust-
ful players to jointly compute a function of their inputs in a
secure way [2]. Security here means that the players compute
the value of the function correctly without learning more than
what they can derive from their own input and output.
A primitive of central importance in secure multi-party
computation is oblivious transfer (OT). In particular, OT is
sufficient to execute any two-party computation securely [3],
[4] and OT can be precomputed offline, i.e., before the actual
inputs to the computation are available, and converted into
OTs later. The original form of OT ((12 )-RabinOT1) has been
introduced by Rabin in [5]. It allows a sender to send a bit
x, which the receiver will get with probability 12 , while the
sender does not learn whether the message has arrived or not.
Another variant of OT, called one-out-of-two bit-OT ((21)-OT1)
was defined in [6]. Here, the sender has two input bits x0 and
x1. The receiver gives as input a choice bit c and receives xc
without learning x1−c. The sender gets no information about
the choice bit c. Other important variants of OT are
(
n
t
)
-OTk
where the inputs are strings of k bits and the receiver can
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choose t < n out of n secrets and (p)-RabinOTk where
the inputs are strings of k bits and the erasure probability
is p ∈ [0, 1].
If the players have access to noiseless classical or quan-
tum communication only, it is impossible to implement
information-theoretically secure OT, i.e. secure against an
adversary with unlimited computing power. The primitives
(p)-RabinOTk and
(
2
1
)
-OT1 are equally powerful [7], i.e.,
one can be implemented from the other. Numerous reductions
of
(
n
1
)
-OTk to
(
2
1
)
-OTk
′
are known [8], [9], [10], [11], [12].
There has also been a lot of interest in reductions of OT to
weaker primitives. For example, OT can be realized from noisy
channels [13], [14], [15], [16], noisy correlations [17], [18],
or weak variants of oblivious transfer [13], [19], [20], [21],
[22], [23].
In the quantum setting, OT can be implemented from black-
box commitments [24], [25], [26], [27]; this reduction is
impossible in the classical setting1.
Given these positive results it is natural to ask how efficient
such reductions can be in principle, i.e., how many instances
of a given primitive are needed to implement OT.
A. Previous Results
Several lower bounds for OT reductions are known. The
earliest impossibility result for information-theoretically se-
cure reductions of OT [28] shows that the number of (21)-OT1
cannot be extended, i.e., there does not exist a protocol using
n instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1 that perfectly implements m > n
instances. Lower bounds on the number of instances of OT
needed to perfectly implement other variants of OT have been
presented in [11] (see also [29]). These bounds have been
strengthened and generalized to secure sampling of arbitrary
two-party distributions in [12], [30], [31], [32]. These bounds
apply to the semi-honest model (where dishonest players
follow the protocol, but try to gain additional information
from the transcript of the computation) and in the case of
implementations of OT also to the malicious model (where
dishonest players behave arbitrarily). In the malicious model
these bounds can be improved [33]. Lower bounds on the
number of ANDs needed to implement general functions have
been presented in [34].
These results only consider perfect protocols and do not
give much insight into the case of statistical implementations.
As pointed out in [33], their result only applies to the perfect
1The existence of a classical reduction of OT to bit commitment in the ma-
licious model would imply a semi-honest OT protocol from a communication
channel only.
case, because there is a statistically secure protocol that is
more efficient [35]. There can be a large gap between the
efficiency of perfect and statistical protocols, as shown in [34]:
The number of OTs needed to compute the equality function is
exponentially bigger in the perfect case than in the statistical
case. Therefore, it is not true in general that a bound in the
perfect case implies a similar bound in the statistical case.
So far very little is known in the statistical case. In [36] a
proof sketch of a lower bound for statistical implementations
of
(
2
1
)
-OTk has been presented. However, this result only
holds in the asymptotic case, where the number n of resource
primitives goes to infinity and the error goes to zero as n
goes to infinity. In [34] a non-asymptotic lower bound on the
number of ANDs needed for one-sided secure computation
of arbitrary functions with Boolean output has been shown.
This result directly implies lower bounds for protocols that
use
(
n
t
)
-OTk as a black-box. However, besides being restricted
to Boolean-valued functions this result is not strong enough
to show optimality of several known reductions and it does
not provide bounds for reductions to randomized primitives
such as (12 )-RabinOT
1
. The impossibility results for perfectly
secure implementations of randomized two-party primitives
of [31], [32] should also generalize to the case of a small
statistical error according to the authors.
In the quantum setting almost all known negative results
show that a certain primitive is impossible to implement from
scratch. Commitment has been shown to be impossible in the
quantum setting in [37], [38]. Using a similar proof, it has been
shown in [39] that general one-sided two-party computation
and in particular oblivious transfer are also impossible to
implement securely in the quantum setting.
The only lower bounds for quantum protocols where the
players have access to resource primitives (such as different
variants of OT) have been presented in [40], where The-
orem 4.7 shows that important lower bounds for classical
protocols also apply to perfectly secure quantum reductions.
B. Contributions
In Section III we consider statistically secure protocols
that compute a function between two parties from trusted
randomness distributed to the players. We provide two bounds
on the efficiency of such reductions — in terms of the
conditional Shannon entropy and the mutual information of
the randomness — that allow us in particular to derive bounds
on the minimal number of
(
n
1
)
-OTk or (p)-RabinOTk needed
to compute a general function securely. Our results hold in
the non-asymptotic regime, i.e., we consider a finite number
of resource primitives and our results hold for any error.
We will use the formalism of smooth entropies to show
that one of these two bounds can be generalized to a bound
in terms of the conditional min-entropy. This leads to tighter
bounds in many cases and to arbitrarily better bounds for some
reductions.
In Section III-A we provide an additional bound for the
special case of statistical implementations of
(
n
1
)
-OTk in the
semi-honest model. Lower bounds for implementations of
OT in the semi-honest model imply similar bounds in the
malicious model (cf. Section III-E and Appendix A). The
bounds for implementations of
(
n
1
)
-OTk (Theorem 4) imply
the following corollary that gives a general bound on the
conversion rate between different variants of OT.
Corollary 1: For any reduction that implements M in-
stances of
(
N
1
)
-OTK from m instances of
(
n
1
)
-OTk in the
semi-honest model with an error of at most ε, we have
m
M
≥ max
(
(N − 1)K
(n− 1)k ,
K
k
,
logN
logn
)
− 7NK · (ε+ h(ε)) .
Corollary 1 generalizes the lower bounds from [11], [12],
[30] to the statistical case and is strictly stronger than the
impossibility bounds from [36]. If we let M = m + 1,
N = n = 2 and K = k = 1, we obtain a stronger
version of Theorem 3 from [28] which states that OT cannot
be extended. Note that the impossibility results for perfectly
secure implementations of randomized two-party primitives of
[31], [32] deliver stronger bounds in general (cf. Example 4.1
in [32]), and according to the authors these results should also
generalize to the case of a small statistical error. However, in
contrast to our results they are restricted to randomized prim-
itives only and do not apply to general two-party functions.
Our lower bounds show that the following protocols are
(close to) optimal in the sense that they use the minimal
number of instances of the given primitive.
• The protocol in [41], [11] which uses N−1n−1 instances of(
n
1
)
-OTk to implement
(
N
1
)
-OTk is optimal.
• The protocol in [12] which uses t instances of(
n
1
)
-OTkn
t−1
to implement
(
nt
1
)
-OTk is optimal.
• In the semi-honest model, the trivial protocol that imple-
ments
(
2
1
)
-OTk from k instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1 is optimal.
In the malicious case, the protocol in [35] uses asymptot-
ically (as k goes to infinity) the same amount of instances
and is therefore asymptotically optimal.
• The protocol in [42] that implements
(
2
1
)
-OTk from
(12 )-RabinOT
1 in the malicious model is asymptotically
optimal.
While previous results suggest that quantum protocols are
not more efficient than classical protocols for reductions
between different variants of oblivious transfer, we present
in Section IV a statistically secure protocol that violates the
classical bounds and the bound for perfectly secure quantum
protocols by an arbitrarily large factor. More precisely, we
prove that, in the quantum setting, string oblivious transfer
can be reversed much more efficiently than by any classical
protocol. We show that a weaker lower bound for quantum
reductions holds also for quantum protocols in the statistical
setting (Theorem 8). This result implies in particular that
quantum protocols cannot extend oblivious transfer, i.e., there
exists a constant c > 0 such that any quantum reduction
of m + 1 instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1 to m instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1
must have an error of at least cm . Finally, we also derive a
lower bound on the number of commitments (Theorem 10)
and on the total number of bits the players need to commit to
(Theorem 7) in any ε-secure implementation of (21)-OTk from
commitments.
Corollary 2: A protocol that implements
(
2
1
)
-OTk, using
2
commitments only, with an error of at most 0 < ε ≤ 0.002
must use at least log(1/ε) − 6 individual commitments and
needs to commit to at least (1 − 3√ε) · k − 3h(√ε) bits in
total.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We denote the distribution of a random variable X by
PX(x). Given the distribution PXY over X ×Y , the marginal
distribution is denoted by PX(x) :=
∑
y∈Y PXY (x, y). For
every y ∈ Y with PY (y) > 0, the conditional distribution
PX|Y (x, y) := PXY (x, y)/PY (y) over X × Y defines a
distribution PX|Y=y with PX|Y=y(x) = PX|Y (x, y) over X .
We say that X , Y and Z form a Markov chain, denoted
by X ↔ Y ↔ Z , if X and Z are independent given
Y , which means that PX|Y=y = PX|Y=y;Z=z for all y, z.
Given an event Ω and random variables X and Y with
a joint distribution PΩXY , we use the notation PXΩ|Y=y
for the sub-normalized distribution with PXΩ|Y=y(x) :=
PX|Y=y(x)PΩ|X=x,Y=y(1) . We will also use the shorthand
notation PΩ|X=x to denote the probability PΩ|X=x(1). We use
the convention that PXΩ|Y=y(x) = 0 if PY (y) = 0.
The statistical distance between the distributions PX and
PX′ over the domain X is defined as the maximum, over all
(inefficient) distinguishers δ : X → {0, 1}, of the distinguish-
ing advantage:
D(PX , PX′) := max
δ
| Pr[δ(X) = 1]− Pr[δ(X ′) = 1] | .
If D(PX , PX′) ≤ ε, we may also say that PX is ε-close to
PX′ . The support of a distribution PX over X is defined as
supp (PX) := {x ∈ X : PX(x) > 0}. If x = (x1, . . . , xn)
and T := {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, then xT denotes the
sub-string (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xik) of x. If x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, then x⊕y
denotes the bitwise XOR of x and y.
A. Information Theory
The conditional Shannon entropy of X given Y is defined
as2
H(X |Y ) := −
∑
(x,y)∈supp (PXY )
PXY (x, y) logPX|Y (x, y) .
The mutual information of X and Y given Z is defined as
I(X ;Y |Z) := H(X |Z)−H(X |Y Z) .
Note that X ↔ Y ↔ Z if and only if I(X ;Z|Y ) = 0, i.e.,
X and Z are conditionally independent given Y . We use the
notation
h(p) := −p log p− (1− p) log(1 − p)
for the binary entropy function, i.e., h(p) is the Shannon
entropy of a binary random variable that takes on one value
with probability p and the other with 1 − p. Note that the
function h(p) is concave, which implies that for any 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, we have
h(c · p) ≥ c · h(p) . (1)
2All logarithms are binary.
We will need the chain-rule
H(XY |Z) = H(X |Z) +H(Y |XZ) , (2)
and the following monotonicity inequalities
H(XY |Z) ≥ H(X |Z) ≥ H(X |Y Z) , (3)
I(WX ;Y |Z) ≥ I(X ;Y |Z) , (4)
I(WX ;Y |Z) ≥ I(X ;Y |ZW ) . (5)
We will also need
H(X |Y Z) =
∑
z
PZ(z) ·H(X |Y, Z = z) . (6)
X ↔ Y ↔ Z implies that
H(X |Z) ≥ H(X |Y Z) = H(X |Y ) . (7)
It is easy to show that if W ↔ XZ ↔ Y , then
I(X ;Y |ZW ) ≤ I(X ;Y |Z) and (8)
I(W ;Y |Z) ≤ I(X ;Y |Z) . (9)
We will need the following lemma that we prove in Ap-
pendix C.
Lemma 1: Let (X,Y ), and (Xˆ, Yˆ ) be random variables dis-
tributed according to PXY and PXˆYˆ , and let D(PXY , PXˆYˆ ) ≤
ǫ. Then
H(Xˆ|Yˆ ) ≥ H(X |Y )− ǫ log |X | − h(ǫ) .
Lemma 1 implies Fano’s inequality: For all X, Xˆ ∈ X with
Pr[X 6= Xˆ] ≤ ε, we have
H(X |Xˆ) ≤ ε · log |X |+ h(ε) . (10)
B. Smooth Entropies
The min-entropy Hmin(X) is the negative logarithm of the
probability of the most likely element
Hmin(X) := − logmax
x
PX(x) .
The max-entropy is defined as the logarithm of the size of the
support of PX
Hmax(X) := log |supp (PX)| .
There is no standard definition of conditional min- or max-
entropy. A natural definition of the min-entropy3 is the fol-
lowing
Hmin(X |Y ) : = − log
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PX|Y=y(x)
= − log
∑
y
max
x
PXY (x, y) .
Then 2−Hmin(X|Y ) corresponds to the maximal probability
to guess X from Y . In contrast to Shannon entropy, min-
and max-entropies are not robust to small changes in the
distribution. Therefore, one often considers smoothed versions
of these measures, where the entropy is optimized over a
3This definition has been introduced in [43] in the context of cryptography.
Furthermore, it corresponds to the definition of quantum conditional min-
entropy [44] for the special case of classical states.
3
set of distributions that are close in terms of some distance
measure. While the concept of smoothed entropies has already
been used in the literature on randomness extraction [45], the
term smooth entropy has been introduced in [46]. There it
has been shown that the smoothed conditional min- and max-
entropy4 have similar properties as the Shannon entropy, i.e.,
they satisfy a chain rule, monotonicity and subadditivity.
Definition 1: For random variables X,Y and ε ∈ [0, 1), we
define
Hεmax(X |Y ) := min
Ω:Pr[Ω]≥1−ε
max
y
log |supp (PXΩ|Y=y)|
Hεmin(X |Y ) := max
Ω:Pr[Ω]≥1−ε
− log
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PXΩ|Y=y(x).
In Appendix B we prove various properties of the entropies
Hεmin(X |Y ) and Hεmax(X |Y ).
C. Primitives and Randomized Primitives
In the following we consider two-party primitives that take
inputs x from Alice and y from Bob and output x¯ to Alice and
y¯ to Bob, where (x¯, y¯) are distributed according to PX¯Y¯ |XY .
For simplicity, we identify such a primitive with PX¯Y¯ |XY . If
the primitive has no input and outputs values (u, v) distributed
according to PUV , we may simply write PUV . If the primitive
is deterministic and only Bob gets an output, i.e., if there
exists a function f : X × Y → Z such that PX¯Y¯ |X=x,Y=y(⊥
, f(x, y)) = 1 for all x, y, then we identify the primitive with
the function f .
Examples of such primitives are
(
n
t
)
-OTk, (p)-RabinOTk,
EQn and IPn:
•
(
n
t
)
-OTk is the primitive where Alice has an input x =
(x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ {0, 1}k·n, and Bob has an input c ⊆
{0, . . . , n − 1} with |c| = t. Bob receives y = x|c ∈
{0, 1}tk.
• (p)-RabinOTk is the primitive where Alice has an input
x ∈ {0, 1}k. Bob receives y which is equal to x with
probability p and ∆ otherwise.
• The equality function EQn : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
is defined as
EQn(x, y) :=
{
1, if x = y ,
0, otherwise .
• The inner-product-modulo-two function IPn :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is defined as
IPn(x, y) := ⊕ni=1xiyi.
We often allow a protocol to use a primitive PUV that does
not have any input and outputs u and v distributed according
to the distribution PUV to the players. This is enough to
model reductions to
(
n
t
)
-OTk and (p)-RabinOTk, since these
primitives are equivalent to distributed randomness PUV , i.e.,
there exist two protocols that are secure in the semi-honest
model: one that generates the distributed randomness using
one instance of the primitive, and one that implements one
instance of the primitive using the distributed randomness as
4The variant of conditional min-entropy used there is different from the
one we consider in this article.
input to the two parties. The fact that
(
2
1
)
-OT1 is equivalent to
distributed randomness has been presented in [24], [47]. The
generalization to
(
n
t
)
-OTk is straightforward. The randomized
primitives are obtained by simply choosing all inputs uni-
formly at random. For (p)-RabinOTk, the implementation is
straightforward. Hence, any protocol that uses some instances
of
(
n
t
)
-OTk or (p)-RabinOTk can be converted into a protocol
that only uses a primitive PUV without any input.
D. Protocols and Security in the Semi-Honest Model
We will consider the following model: The two parties
use a primitive PUV that has no input and outputs values
(u, v) distributed according to PUV to the players. Alice
and Bob receive inputs x and y. Then, the players exchange
messages in several rounds, where we assume that Alice sends
the first message. If i is odd, then Alice computes the i-th
message as a randomized function of all previous messages,
her input x and u. If i is even, then Bob computes the i-th
message as a randomized function of all previous messages,
his input y and v. We assume that the number of rounds
is bounded by a constant t. By padding the protocol with
empty rounds, we can thus assume without loss of generality
that the protocol uses t rounds in every execution. After t
rounds, Bob computes his output z˜ as a randomized function
of (M,V, y), where M = (M1, . . . ,Mt) is the sequence of all
messages exchanged. Let PXY UV = PXPY PUV , i.e., each
party chooses her input independently of UV and the other
party’s input. Thus, it holds that
I(X ;Y |V ) = 0 , (11)
I(X ;Y V |U) = 0 . (12)
Since Bob generates his output Z˜ from Y VM , it holds that
I(Z˜;XU |Y VM) = 0 . (13)
Let M0 := ⊥ and M i := (M0, . . . ,Mi). From the definition
of the protocol and the distribution of the inputs, we can
conclude that
I(M2i+1;Y |M2iXV ) = 0 , (14)
I(M2i+1;Y V |M2iXU) = 0 (15)
for all i ∈ {0, · · · , (t− 1)/2}, and
I(M2i;XU |M2i−1Y V ) = 0 (16)
for all i ∈ {1, · · · , (t − 1)/2}. Applying the monotonicity
inequalities for conditional mutual information to equality (16)
yields the two equalities
I(M2i;X |M2i−1Y V ) = 0 , (17)
I(M2i;X |M2i−1Y UV ) = 0 . (18)
By repeatedly applying inequality (8) and the Markov chain
relations (14) and (17) we obtain that
I(Y ;X |VM) ≤ I(Y ;X |V ) .
4
Equality (13) implies I(Z˜;X |VMY ) = 0. Thus, we can
conclude, together with equality (11), that
I(Z˜Y ;X |VM) ≤ I(Y ;X |VM) ≤ I(Y ;X |V ) = 0 . (19)
Similarly, the Markov chain relations (15) and (18) imply,
together with equality (12), that
I(Z˜Y V ;X |UM) ≤ I(Y V ;X |UM) ≤ I(Y V ;X |U) = 0 .
(20)
We will consider the semi-honest model, where both players
behave honestly, but may save all the information they get
during the protocol to obtain extra information about the
other player’s input or output. A protocol securely implements
f : X × Y → Z with an error ε, if the entire view of each
player can be simulated with an error of at most ε in an
ideal setting, where the players only have black-box access
to the primitive f : X × Y → Z . Note that this simulation
is allowed to change neither the input nor the output. This
definition of security follows Definition 7.2.1 from [48], but is
adapted to the case of computationally unbounded adversaries
and statistical indistinguishability.
Definition 2: Let Π be a protocol with black-box access to
a primitive PUV that implements a primitive f : X ×Y → Z .
The random variables V iewΠA(x, y) and V iewΠB(x, y) de-
note the views of Alice and Bob on input (x, y) defined
as (x, u,m1, . . . ,mt, rA) and (y, v,m1, . . . ,mt, rB), respec-
tively, where rA (rB) is the private randomness of Alice (Bob),
mi represents the i-th message and u, v is the output from
PUV . Out
Π
B(x, y) denotes the output (which is implicit in the
view) of Bob on input (x, y). The protocol is secure in the
semi-honest model with an error of at most ε, if there exist
two randomized functions SA and SB , called the simulators5,
such that for all x and y:
D((V iewΠA(x, y), Out
Π
B(x, y)), (SA(x), z)) ≤ ε ,
D((V iewΠB(x, y), Out
Π
B(x, y)), (SB(y, z), z)) ≤ ε ,
where z = f(x, y).
Note that security in the semi-honest model does not directly
imply security in the malicious model, as the simulator is
allowed to change the input/output in the malicious model,
while he is not allowed to do so in the semi-honest model.
We will, therefore, also consider security in the weak semi-
honest model, which is implied both by security in the semi-
honest model and by security in the malicious model. Here, the
simulator is allowed to change the input to the ideal primitive
and change the output from the ideal primitive. Thus, in order
to show impossibility of certain protocols in the malicious and
in the semi-honest model, it is sufficient to show impossibility
in the weak semi-honest model.
E. Sufficient Statistics
Intuitively speaking, the sufficient statistics of X with
respect to Y , denoted X ց Y , is the part of X that is
correlated with Y .
5We do not require the simulator to be efficient.
Definition 3: Let X and Y be random variables, and let
f(x) = PY |X=x. The sufficient statistics of X with respect to
Y is defined as X ց Y = f(X).
It is easy to show (see for example [49]) that for any PXY ,
we have X ↔ X ց Y ↔ Y . This immediately implies that
any protocol with access to a primitive PUV can be trans-
formed into a protocol with access to PUցV,VցU (without
compromising the security) because the players can compute
PUV from PUցV,VցU privately. Thus, in the following we
only consider primitives PUV where U = U ց V and
V = V ց U .
F. Common Part
The common part was first introduced in [50]. In a cryp-
tographic context, it was used in [17]. Roughly speaking, the
common part X ∧ Y of X and Y is the maximal element
of the set of all random variables (i.e., the finest random
variable) that can be generated both from X and from Y
without any error. For example, if X = (X0, X1) ∈ {0, 1}2
and Y = (Y0, Y1) ∈ {0, 1}2, and we have X0 = Y0 and
Pr[X1 6= Y1] = ε > 0, then the common part of X and Y is
equivalent to X0.
Definition 4: Let X and Y be random variables with distri-
bution PXY . Let X := supp(PX) and Y := supp(PY ). Then
X ∧ Y , the common part of X and Y , is constructed in the
following way:
• Consider the bipartite graph G with vertex set X ∪ Y ,
and where two vertices x ∈ X and y ∈ Y are connected
by an edge if PXY (x, y) > 0 holds.
• Let fX : X → 2X∪Y be the function that maps a vertex
v ∈ X of G to the set of vertices in the connected
component of G containing v. Let fY : Y → 2X∪Y
be the function that does the same for a vertex w ∈ Y of
G.
• X ∧ Y :≡ fX(X) ≡ fY (Y ) .
III. IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS FOR CLASSICAL SECURE
FUNCTION EVALUATION
Let a protocol be an ε-secure implementation of a primitive
f : X × Y → Z in the semi-honest model. Let PXY be
the input distribution and let M be the whole communication
during the execution of the protocol. Then the security of the
protocol implies the following lemma that we will use in our
proofs.
Lemma 2:
H(X |VM) ≥ H(X |Y f(X,Y ))− ε log |X | − h(ε) .
Proof: The security of the protocol implies that there
exists a randomized function SB , the simulator, such that
D(PXY SB(Y,f(X,Y )), PXY VM ) ≤ ε. We can use Lemma 1
and (7) to obtain
H(X |VM) ≥ H(X |SB(Y, f(X,Y )))− ε log |X | − h(ε)
≥ H(X |Y f(X,Y ))− ε log |X | − h(ε) .
We will now give lower bounds for information-
theoretically secure implementations of functions f : X×Y →
5
Z from a primitive PUV in the semi-honest model. Let
f : X × Y → Z be a function such that
∀x 6= x′ ∈ X ∃y ∈ Y : f(x, y) 6= f(x′, y) . (21)
This means that it is possible to compute x from the
set {(f(x, y), y) : y ∈ Y} for any x. In any secure
implementation of f , Alice does not learn which y Bob has
chosen, but has to make sure that Bob can compute f(x, y) for
any y. This implies that she cannot hold back any information
about x. The statement of Lemma 3 formally captures this
intuition.
Unless otherwise specified, we assume that Alice and Bob
choose their inputs X and Y uniformly at random and
independent of everything else in the following.
Lemma 3: For any protocol that is an ε-secure implemen-
tation of a function f : X × Y → Z that satisfies (21) in the
semi-honest model, we have for any y ∈ Y
H(X |UM,Y = y) ≤ (3|Y| − 2)(ε log |Z|+ h(ε))
Proof: There exists a randomized function SA, the sim-
ulator, such that
D(PXMU|Y =y, PXSA(X)) ≤ ε
for all y ∈ Y . Therefore, the triangle inequality implies that
for any y, y′
D(PXMU|Y =y, PXMU|Y=y′) ≤ 2ε . (22)
If Bob’s input is fixed to any y ∈ Y and Alice’s input X
is still uniform, then the resulting distribution of XZUM
is PXZUM|Y =y . Thus, we can apply the Markov chain re-
lation (20) and the monotonicity of the conditional mutual in-
formation to obtain the equality I(X ;Z|UM,Y = y) = 0 for
all y. Furthermore, we have Pr[Z 6= f(X,Y ) | Y = y] ≤ ε.
Thus, it follows from (7) and (10) that
H(f(X, y)|UM,Y = y) ≤ H(f(X, y)|Z, Y = y)
≤ ε · log |Z|+ h(ε) . (23)
Together with (22) and Lemma 1 this implies that for any y, y′
H(f(X, y)|UM,Y = y′) ≤ 3ε log |Z|+ h(ε) + h(2ε)
≤ 3(ε log |Z|+ h(ε)) ,
where the second inequality follows from (1). Since X can be
computed from the values f(X, y1), . . . , f(X, y|Y|), we obtain
H(X |UM,Y = y) ≤ H(f(X, y1), . . . f(X, y|Y|)|UM,Y = y)
≤
∑
y′∈Y
H(f(X, y′)|UM,Y = y)
≤ (3|Y| − 2)(ε log |Z|+ h(ε)) ,
where we used (3) in the first and (2) and (3) in the second
inequality.
Theorem 1: Let f : X ×Y → Z be a function that satisfies
(21). If there exists a protocol that implements f from a
primitive PUV with an error ε in the semi-honest model, then
H(U |V ) ≥max
y
H(X |f(X, y))
− (3|Y| − 1)(ε log |Z|+ h(ε))− ε log |X | .
Proof: Let y ∈ Y . By Lemma 3 and inequality (3), we
conclude that
H(X |UVM, Y = y) ≤ H(X |UM,Y = y)
≤ (3|Y| − 2)(ε log |Z|+ h(ε)) .
We can use (3), (2) and Lemma 1 to obtain
H(X |VM, Y = y)
= H(U |VM, Y = y) +H(X |UVM, Y = y)
−H(U |XVM,Y = y)
≤ H(U |VM, Y = y) + (3|Y| − 2)(ε log |Z|+ h(ε))
≤ H(U |V ) + (3|Y| − 2)(ε log |Z|+ h(ε)) .
By applying Lemma 2 to the case where Alice’s input X is
uniform and Bob’s input is fixed to y, we know that
H(X |f(X, y))− ε log |X | − h(ε) ≤ H(X |VM, Y = y) .
The statement follows by maximizing over all y.
Note that in (23) the term log |Z| could be replaced by
df := logmax
y
|{f(x, y) : x ∈ X}| ≤ logmin(|Z|, |X |).
The resulting bound,
H(U |V ) ≥max
y
H(X |f(X, y))
− (3|Y| − 1)(ε · df + h(ε))− ε log |X | ,
is stronger in general, but does not lead to improved results
for the examples considered here.
If the domain |Y| of a function is large, Theorem 1 may
only imply a rather weak bound. A simple way to improve this
bound is to restrict the domain of f , i.e., to consider a function
f ′(x, y) : X ′ × Y ′ → Z where X ′ ⊂ X and Y ′ ⊂ Y with
f ′(x, y) = f(x, y) that still satisfies condition (21). Clearly,
if f can be computed from a primitive PUV with an error
ε in the semi-honest model, then f ′ can be computed with
the same error. Thus, any lower bound for f ′ implies a lower
bound for f .
Corollary 3: For any implementation of m independent
instances of
(
n
t
)
-OTk from a primitive PUV that is ε-secure in
the semi-honest model, the following lower bound must hold:
H(U |V ) ≥ ((1 − ε)n− t)km− (3⌈n/t⌉ − 1) (εmtk + h(ε)) .
Proof: We can choose subsets Ci ⊆ {0, . . . , n −
1}, with 1 ≤ i ≤ ⌈n/t⌉, of size t such that ⋃⌈n/t⌉i=1 Ci =
{0, . . . , n−1}, and restrict Bob to choose one of these sets as
input for every instance of OT. It is easy to check that condition
(21) is satisfied. The statement follows from Theorem 1.
For our next lower-bound, the function f must satisfy the
following property. Let f : X × Y → Z be a function such
that there exist y1 ∈ Y such that
∀x 6= x′ ∈ X : f(x, y1) 6= f(x′, y1) , (24)
6
and y2 ∈ Y such that
∀x, x′ ∈ X : f(x, y2) = f(x′, y2) . (25)
Therefore, Bob will receive Alice’s whole input if his input is
y1, and will get no information about Alice’s input if his input
is y2. This property can for example be satisfied by restricting
Alice’s input in
(
n
t
)
-OTk, as we will see in Corollary 4.
Let Alice’s input X be uniformly distributed. Loosely
speaking, the security of the protocol implies that the com-
munication gives (almost) no information about Alice’s input
X if Bob’s input is y2. But the communication must be
(almost) independent of Bob’s input, otherwise Alice could
learn Bob’s input. Thus, Alice’s input X is uniform with
respect to the whole communication even when Bob’s input is
y1. Let now Bob’s input be fixed to y1 and let M be the whole
communication. The following lower bound can be proved
using the given intuition.
Lemma 4:
H(f(X, y1)|M,U ∧ V , Y = y1)
≥ log |X | − 6(ε log |X |+ h(ε)) .
Proof: Let gU , gV be the functions that compute the
common part of PUV . As in inequality (22) in the proof of
Lemma 3, we obtain that
D(PXMU|Y =y, PXMU|Y=y′) ≤ 2ε ,
for all y 6= y′ ∈ Y . This implies that
D(PXMgU (U)|Y=y, PXMgU (U)|Y=y′) ≤ 2ε , (26)
and
D(PXPMgU (U)|Y=y, PXPMgU (U)|Y=y′) ≤ 2ε . (27)
Since the protocol is secure, there exists a simulator SB such
that
D(PXMV |Y=y2 , PXSB(y2,f(X,y2))) ≤ ε .
From the property (25), we can conclude that
D(PXMV |Y=y2 , PXPSB(y2,f(X,y2))) ≤ ε.
From security of the protocol (Definition 2) we know that
D(PSB(y2,f(X,y2)), PMV |Y=y2) ≤ ε, which immediately im-
plies D(PXPSB(y2,f(X,y2)), PXPMV |Y=y2) ≤ ε. Therefore,
we can use the triangle inequality to derive the following upper
bound on the distance from uniform of X with respect to
MgU (U) conditioned on y2:
D(PXMgU (U)|Y=y2 , PXPMgU (U)|Y=y2)
≤ D(PXMV |Y=y2 , PXPMV |Y=y2)
≤ D(PXMV |Y=y2 , PXPSB(y2,f(X,y2)))
+ D(PXPSB(y2,f(X,y2)), PXPMV |Y=y2)
≤ 2ε . (28)
This implies that a weaker upper bound also holds conditioned
on y1 as follows: We can use the triangle inequality again to
conclude from (26), (27) and (28) that
D(PXMgU (U)|Y=y1 , PXPMgU (U)|Y=y1)
≤ D(PXMgU (U)|Y=y1 , PXMgU (U)|Y=y2)
+ D(PXMgU (U)|Y=y2 , PXPMgU (U)|Y=y2)
+ D(PXPMgU (U)|Y=y2 , PXPMgU (U)|Y=y1)
≤ 6ε .
Therefore, we obtain
H(f(X, y1)|M,U ∧ V,Y = y1)
= H(X |M,U ∧ V, Y = y1)
≥ log |X | − 6(ε log |X | − h(ε)) ,
where we used Lemma 1.
We use Lemma 4 to prove the following lower bound
on the mutual information of the distributed randomness for
implementations of a two-party function f from a primitive
PUV in the semi-honest model.
Theorem 2: Let f : X ×Y → Z be a function that satisfies
(24) and (25). Then, for any protocol that implements f with
an error of at most ε in the semi-honest model from a primitive
PUV , the following lower bound must hold:
I(U ;V ) ≥ I(U ;V |U ∧ V )
≥ log |X | − 7(ε log |X |+ h(ε)) .
Proof: Let Alice’s input X be uniformly distributed and
Bob’s input be fixed to y1. Let Z be Bob’s output and M the
whole communication. Then Lemma 4 implies that
H(f(X, y1)|M,U ∧ V ) ≥ log |X | − 6(ε log |X | − h(ε)) .
(29)
Since Pr[Z 6= f(X, y1)] ≤ ε and X ↔ VM ↔ Z , it follows
from (7) and (10) that
H(f(X, y1)|VM) ≤ H(f(X, y1)|Z) ≤ ε log |X |+ h(ε) .
(30)
Inequalities (29) and (30) imply, using X ↔ UM ↔ ZY V ,
(9) and (4), that
I(U ;V |M,U ∧ V ) ≥ I(X ;V |M,U ∧ V )
≥ I(f(X, y1);V |M,U ∧ V )
= H(f(X, y1)|M,U ∧ V )
−H(f(X, y1)|VM,U ∧ V )
≥ log |X | − 7(ε log |X | − h(ε)) .
Let M i := (M1, . . . ,Mi), i.e., the sequence of all messages
sent until the i-th round. Without loss of generality, let us
assume that Alice sends the message of the (i+ 1)-th round.
Since, we have M i+1 ↔M iU ↔ V , it follows from (8) that
I(U ;V |M i+1, U ∧ V ) ≤ I(U ;V |M i, U ∧ V ) .
By induction over all rounds, it holds that
I(U ;V |M,U ∧ V ) ≤ I(U ;V |U ∧ V ) .
Since U ∧ V ↔ U ↔ V , the statement of the theorem follows.
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The next corollary provides a lower bound on the mutual
information for implementations of
(
n
t
)
-OTk from a primitive
PUV . It follows immediately from Theorem 2.
Corollary 4: If there exists a protocol that implements m
independent instances of
(
n
t
)
-OTk from a primitive PUV with
an error of at most ε in the semi-honest model, then the
following lower bounds must hold: If t ≤ ⌊n/2⌋, then
I(U ;V |U ∧ V ) ≥ mtk − 7(εmtk + h(ε)) .
If t > ⌊n/2⌋, then
I(U ;V |U ∧ V ) ≥ m(n− t)k − 7(εm(n− t)k + h(ε)) .
Proof: In the first case, consider the function that is
obtained by setting the first n − t inputs to a fixed value
and choosing the remaining t inputs from {0, 1}tk for every
instance of OT. In the second case, we use the fact that(
2n−2t
n−t
)
-OTk can be obtained from
(
n
t
)
-OTk by fixing 2t− n
inputs. Thus, both bounds follow from Theorem 2.
An instance of
(
2
1
)
-OT1 can be implemented from one
instance of
(
2
1
)
-OT1 in the opposite direction [51]. Therefore,
it follows immediately from Corollary 3 that
H(V |U) ≥ 1− 5h(ε)− 7ε ,
since any violation of this bound would contradict the bound of
Corollary 3. We will show that a generalization of this bound
also holds for m independent copies of
(
n
1
)
-OTk for any n ≥
2. Note that we can assume that k = 1. The resulting bound
then also implies a bound for k > 1 because one instance of(
n
1
)
-OT1 can be implemented from one instance of
(
n
1
)
-OTk.
Theorem 3: Let a protocol having access to PUV be an ε-
secure implementation of m independent copies of
(
n
1
)
-OT1
in the semi-honest model. Then
H(V |U) ≥ m logn−m(4 logn+ 7)(ε+ h(ε)) .
Proof: Let Alice and Bob choose their inputs X =
(X1, . . . , Xm) ∈ {0, 1}mn, where X i = (X i0, . . . , X in−1),
and C = (C1, . . . , Cm) ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}m uniformly at
random. Let Y = (Y 1, . . . , Y m) be the output of Bob at the
end of the protocol. Let j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. First, we consider
the jth instance of
(
n
1
)
-OT1. Let Ai := Xj0 ⊕ Xji , for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. From the security of the protocol follows
that there exists a randomized function SB(c, xc) such that for
all a = (a1, . . . , an−1) ∈ {0, 1}n−1,
D(PY CVM|A=a, PXCCSB(C,XC)) ≤ ε .
Hence, the triangle inequality implies that
D(PY jCjVM|A=a,PY jCjVM|A=a′)
≤ D(PY CVM|A=a, PY CVM|A=a′)
≤ 2ε (31)
holds for all a, a′. We have Pr[Y j 6= XjC | A = a] ≤ ε for
all a. If A = (0, . . . , 0), we have XjC = X
j
0 . Since Xj ↔
VM ↔ Y j , it follows from (3) and (10) that
H(Y j |VM,A = (0, . . . , 0)) ≤ H(Y j |Xj, A = (0, . . . , 0))
≤ H(Y j |Xj0 , A = (0, . . . , 0))
≤ ε+ h(ε) . (32)
Now, we map Cj to a bit string of size ⌈logn⌉. Let Cb be the
b-th bit of that bit string, where b ∈ {0, . . . , ⌈logn⌉ − 1}. Let
ab = (ab1, . . . , a
b
n−1), where abi = 1 if and only if the b-th bit of
the binary representation of i is 1. Conditioned on A = ab, we
have XjC = X
j
0 ⊕ Cb. It follows from Xj ↔ VM ↔ Y jCj ,
(3) and (10) that
H(Y j ⊕ Cb|VM,A = ab) ≤ H(Y j ⊕ Cb|Xj0 , A = ab)
≤ ε+ h(ε) . (33)
By Lemma 1, (31) and (32), we obtain
H(Y j |VMA) ≤ ε+ h(ε) + 2ε+ h(2ε) ≤ 3ε+ 3h(ε).
It follows from Lemma 1, (31) and (33) that for all b
H(Y j ⊕ Cb|VMA) ≤ 3ε+ 3h(ε) .
Since (Cj , Y j) can be calculated from (Y j , Y j⊕C0, . . . , Y j⊕
C⌈log n⌉−1), this implies that
H(CjY j |VMA) ≤ 3(⌈logn⌉+ 1)(ε+ h(ε)) .
The Markov chain A ↔ VM ↔ CjY j , ⌈logn⌉ ≤ logn + 1
and inequality (3) imply that
H(Cj |VM) ≤ 3(logn+ 2)(ε+ h(ε)) .
Thus we can use (2) and (3) to obtain
H(C|VM) ≤
n∑
j=1
H(Cj |VM)
≤ 3m(logn+ 2)(ε+ h(ε)) .
We can use (2), (3) and Lemmas 1 to obtain
H(C|UM) = H(V |UM) +H(C|UVM)−H(V |CUM)
≤ H(V |UM) + 3m(logn+ 2)(ε+ h(ε))
≤ H(V |U) + 3m(logn+ 2)(ε+ h(ε)) .
The security of the protocol implies that there exists a random-
ized function SA such that D(PCSA(X), PCUM ) ≤ ε. Using
Lemma 1 and inequality (7), we obtain that
H(C|UM) ≥ H(C|SA(X))− εm logn− h(ε)
≥ H(C|X)− εm logn− h(ε)
Altogether, Corollary 3, Corollary 4 and Theorem 3 prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 4: If there exists a protocol having access to PUV
that implements m instances of
(
n
1
)
-OTk with an error of at
most ε in the semi-honest model, then
H(U |V ) ≥ m(n− 1)k − (4n− 1)(εmk + h(ε)) ,
H(V |U) ≥ m logn−m(4 logn+ 7)(ε+ h(ε)) ,
I(U ;V |U ∧ V ) ≥ mk − 7εmk − 7h(ε) .
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Since m instances of
(
n
1
)
-OTk are equivalent to a prim-
itive PUV with H(U |V ) = m(n − 1)k, I(U ;V ) = mk
and H(V |U) = m logn, any protocol that implements M
instances of
(
N
1
)
-OTK from m instances of
(
n
1
)
-OTk with an
error of at most ε needs to satisfy the following inequalities:
m(n− 1)k ≥M(N − 1)K − (4N − 1)(εMK + h(ε)) ,
mk ≥MK − 7εMK − 7h(ε) ,
m logn ≥M logN −M(4 logN + 7)(ε+ h(ε)) .
Thus, we get Corollary 1.
We will now use the proof of Theorem 1 and the smooth
entropy formalism to derive a lower bound on the conditional
min-entropy for information-theoretically secure implementa-
tions of functions f : X×Y → Z from a primitive PUV in the
semi-honest model. As a motivation, consider the following
question: is it possible to ε-securely implement
(
2
1
)
-OTK
from (1/2)-RabinOTk? Corollary 3 only tells us that K must
be smaller than or equal to k/2. Our lower bound on the
conditional smooth min-entropy, however, implies that there
is no such implementation if K ≥ 2 and 0 ≤ ε < 0.25,
independently of k.
Let f : X × Y → Z be a function that satisfies (21).
Let Alice and Bob choose their inputs X and Y uniformly
at random and let M be the whole communication during
the protocol. For the rest of this section, we assume that
all parameters are sufficiently small such that the smoothing
parameters of the smooth entropies are always in [0, 1).
Lemma 5: If there exists an ε-secure implementation of f :
X ×Y → Z from a primitive PUV in the (weak) semi-honest
model, then
H3|Y|εmax (X |UM,Y = y) = 0 .
Proof: Since the protocol is secure for Bob, there exists
a randomized function SA such that
D(PXMU|Y =y, PXSA(X)) ≤ ε
for all y ∈ Y . Therefore, for any y, y′
D(PXMU|Y =y, PXMU|Y=y′) ≤ 2ε . (34)
It holds that I(X ;Z|UM,Y = y) = 0. Furthermore, we have
Pr[Z 6= f(X,Y ) | Y = y] ≤ ε. Thus, Lemmas 18 and 19
imply that
Hεmax(f(X, y)|UM,Y = y) ≤ Hεmax(f(X, y)|Z, Y = y) = 0.
(35)
Together with (34), this implies that for any y, y′
H3εmax(f(X, y)|UM,Y = y′) = 0 .
Since X can be computed from the values
f(X, y1), . . . , f(X, y|Y|), we obtain
H3|Y|εmax (X |UM,Y = y)
≤ H3|Y|εmax (f(X, y1), . . . , f(X, y|Y|)|UM,Y = y)
≤
∑
y′∈Y
H3εmax(f(X, y
′)|UM,Y = y)
= 0 .
where we used Lemma 19 and the subadditivity of the max-
entropy (Lemma 14).
Let PXY be the input distribution to the ideal primitive.
Then the security of the protocol implies the following lemma.
Lemma 6: For any protocol that is an ε-secure implemen-
tation of f : X × Y → Z from a primitive PUV in the semi-
honest model,
Hε+ε
′
min (X |VM) ≥ Hε
′
min(X |Y f(X,Y )) ,
for any ε′ ≥ 0.
Proof: The security of the protocol implies that there
exists a randomized function SB , the simulator, such that
D(PXY SB(Y,f(X,Y )), PXY VM ) ≤ ε. Therefore, we obtain
Hε+ε
′
min (X |VM) ≥ Hε
′
min(X |SB(Y, f(X,Y )))
≥ Hε′min(X |Y f(X,Y )) ,
where we used Lemma 17 in the second inequality.
Theorem 5: Let f : X ×Y → Z be a function that satisfies
(21). If there exists a protocol having access to a primitive
PUV that implements f with an error of at most ε in the
semi-honest model, then
H
(3|Y|+1)ε+ε′
min (U |V ) ≥ maxy H
ε′
min(X |f(X, y)) ,
for any ε′ ≥ 0.
Proof: Let y ∈ Y . It follows from Lemmas 5 and 15 that
H3|Y|εmax (X |UVM, Y = y) ≤ H3|Y|εmax (X |UM,Y = y) = 0 .
Therefore, Lemma 15 and 16 implies that
Hε+ε
′
min (X |VM, Y = y)−H3|Y|εmax (X |UVM, Y = y)
≤ H(3|Y|+1)ε+ε′min (U |VM, Y = y)
≤ H(3|Y|+1)ε+ε′min (U |V ) .
We can use Lemma 6 to obtain
Hε
′
min(X |f(X, y)) ≤ Hε+ε
′
min (X |VM, Y = y) .
The statement follows by maximizing over all y.
A. Lower Bounds for Protocols implementing OT
Corollary 5: Any protocol that implements M instances of(
N
1
)
-OTK from m instances of
(
n
1
)
-OTk with an error of at
most 0 ≤ ε < 12(3n+1) in the semi-honest model must satisfy
m(n− 1)k ≥M(N − 1)K − (6n+ 2)ε .
Proof: From Theorem 5 follows that
H
(3n+1)ε
min (U |V ) ≥M(N − 1)K . (36)
For the distribution PUV of randomized OTs, the entropy
H ε¯min(U |V ) with 0 ≤ ε¯ < 1 is maximized by the event Ω
with PΩ|U=u,V=v = 1− ε¯ for all u, v in the support of PUV .
Therefore, we have
H
(3n+1)ε
min (U |V ) ≤ − log(2−m(n−1)k(1− (3n+ 1)ε))
= m(n− 1)k − log(1− (3n+ 1)ε) . (37)
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The statement follows from the fact that log(1/ε) ≤ 2(1− ε)
for 1/2 ≤ ε ≤ 1.
This corollary implies that there is no protocol that extends(
2
1
)
-OT1 in the semi-honest model.
Corollary 6: Any protocol that implements m+1 instances
of
(
2
1
)
-OT1 in the semi-honest model using m instances of(
2
1
)
-OT1 must have an error ε ≥ 1/14.
B. Lower Bounds for Equality Function
Corollary 7: Let a protocol having access to a PUV be an
ε-secure implementation of EQn in the semi-honest model.
Then
H(U |V ) ≥ (1 − ε)k − (3 · 2k − 1)(ε+ h(ε))− 1 ,
and
H
(3·2k+1)ε
min (U |V ) ≥ k − 1 ,
for all 0 < k ≤ n. If 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1/(6 · 2k + 2) and PUV is
equivalent to m instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1, then
m ≥ k − 1− (6 · 2k + 2)ε ,
for all 0 < k ≤ n.
Proof: We can restrict the input domains of both players
to the same subsets of size 2k. Condition (21) will still
be satisfied. Thus, the corollary follows immediately from
Theorems 1 and 5.
There exists a secure reduction of EQn to EQk ([34]): Alice
and Bob compare k inner products of their inputs with random
strings using EQk. This protocol is secure in the semi-honest
model with an error of at most 2−k. Since there exists a
circuit to implement EQk with k XOR and k AND gates,
it follows from [3] that EQk can be securely implemented
using k instances of
(
4
1
)
-OT1 or 3k instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1
in the semi-honest model. Since m instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1
are equivalent to a primitive PUV with H(U |V ) = m, the
bound of Corollary 7 is optimal up to a factor of 3. We can
improve the above construction with the following protocol
that computes additive shares of (x1 ⊕ y1) ∧ (x2 ⊕ y2) using
two instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1: Alice chooses two random bits
r1, r2 and inputs r1, r1 ⊕ x1 to the first and r2, r2 ⊕ x2 to
the second instance. Bob uses y2 as the choice bit for the first
and y1 as the choice bit for the second instance of OT. Bob
receives two outputs z1 = r1 ⊕ x1y2 and z2 = r2 ⊕ x2y1.
Setting a = r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ x1x2 and b = z1 ⊕ z2 ⊕ y1y2, we have
a⊕b = x1x2⊕y1y2⊕x1y2⊕x2y1 = (x1⊕y1)∧(x2⊕y2). Thus,
we can compute EQk with 2(k − 1) instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1.
C. Lower Bounds for Inner Product Function
Corollary 8: Let a protocol having access to a primitive
PUV be an ε-secure implementation of the inner product
function IPn in the semi-honest model. Then it holds that
H(U |V ) ≥ n− 1− 4n(ε+ h(ε))
and
H
(3k+1)ε
min (U |V ) ≥ n− 1 .
If PUV is equivalent to m instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1 and 0 ≤ ε <
1/(6n+ 2), then
m ≥ n− 1− (6n+ 2)ε .
Proof: Let ei ∈ {0, 1}n be the string that has a one at
the i-th position and is zero otherwise. Let S := {ei : 1 ≤
i ≤ n}. Then the protocol is an ε-secure implementation of
the restriction of the inner-product function to inputs from
{0, 1}n × S. Since this restricted function satisfies condition
(21), the statement follows from Theorem 1.
If ε ≤ 1/(8n), then it immediately follows from Corollary 8
that we need at least n− 2 calls to (21)-OT1 to compute IPn
with an error of at most ε. Consider the following protocol
from [34] that is adapted to
(
2
1
)
-OT1: Alice chooses r =
(r1, . . . , rn−1) uniformly at random and sets rn := ⊕n−1i=1 ri.
Then, for each i, Alice inputs ai,0 := ri and ai,1 := xi ⊕ ri
to the OT and Bob inputs yi. Bob receives zi from the OTs
and outputs ⊕ni=1zi. Since ⊕ni=1zi = ⊕ni=1(xiyi ⊕ ri) =
(⊕ni=1xiyi) ⊕ (⊕ni=1ri) = ⊕ni=1xiyi = IPn(x, y), the pro-
tocol is correct. The security for Alice follows from the
fact that z1, . . . , zn is a uniformly random string subject to
⊕ni=1zi = IPn(x, y). Thus, there exists a perfectly secure
protocol that computes IPn from n instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1.
Hence, Corollary 8 is almost tight.
D. Lower Bounds for Protocols implementing OLFE
We will now show that Theorems 1 and 2 also imply bounds
for oblivious linear function evaluation ((q)-OLFE), which is
defined as follows:
• For any finite field GF (q) of size q, (q)-OLFE is the
primitive where Alice has an input a, b ∈ GF (q) and Bob
has an input c ∈ GF (q). Bob receives d = a + b · c ∈
GF (q).
Corollary 9: Let a protocol having access to PUV be an
ε-secure implementation of m instances of (q)-OLFE in the
semi-honest model. Then
H(U |V ) ≥ m log q − 5(εm log q + h(ε)) , (38)
H(V |U) ≥ m log q − 5(εm log q + h(ε)) , (39)
I(U ;V |U ∧ V ) ≥ m log q − 7(εm log q + h(ε)) . (40)
Proof: Inequalities (38) and (40) follow from Theorem 1
and Theorem 2. Furthermore, it has been shown in [51] that
(q)-OLFE is symmetric. Hence, a violation of (39) would
imply a violation of the lower bound in (38).
E. Lower Bounds for OT in the Malicious Model
In Appendix A, we show that lower bounds in the semi-
honest model imply almost the same bounds in the malicious
model. In the following, we generalize these results by al-
lowing a dishonest Bob to additionally receive randomness
V ′. Moreover, the following provides a stronger impossibility
result, in the case when V ′ is trivial, than the one that follows
from the combination of Lemma A.1 and Theorem 5.
Corollary 10: Let a protocol be an ε-secure implementa-
tion of
(
2
1
)
-OTn in the malicious model from randomness
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(U, V V ′). Then
H7εmin(U |V V ′) ≥ k .
Proof: We consider only honest players, but allow the
simulator to change the inputs to the ideal OT and the outputs
from the ideal OT. Lemma 5 holds in the weak semi-honest
model and, therefore, also in the malicious model. Thus, we
have H6εmax(X |UM,C = c) = 0, where C is the choice bit
of Bob. The security of the protocol implies that there exists
a randomized function SB such that
D(PXSB(C,XC˜), PXV V ′M ) ≤ ε, (41)
where C˜ is the input to the ideal OT by the simulator.
Therefore, we get
Hεmin(X |V V ′M,C = c) ≥ Hmin(X |SB(c,XC˜))
≥ Hmin(X |XC˜)
≥ k .
As in the proof of Theorem 5, this implies
k ≤ Hεmin(X |V V ′M,C = c) ≤ H7εmin(U |V V ′) .
In the same way, we can show that the impossibility result
for implementations of
(
2
1
)
-OTk that follows from Theorem 1
also holds in the malicious model.
Corollary 11: Let a protocol be an ε-secure implementa-
tion of
(
2
1
)
-OTk in the malicious model from randomness
(U, V V ′). Then
H(U |V V ′) ≥ k − 6(kε+ h(ε)) .
Proof: Since Lemma 3 also holds in the malicious model,
inequality (3) implies that
H(X |UV V ′M,C = c) ≤ H(X |UM,C = c)
≤ 4(kε+ h(ε)) .
We can use inequalities (1) and (41) to obtain
H(X |V V ′M,C = c) ≥ H(X |SB(c,XC˜))− ε · 2k − h(ε)
≥ H(X |XC˜)− ε · 2k − h(ε)
≥ k − ε · 2k − h(ε) .
As in the proof of Theorem 1, this implies
H(U |V V ′) ≥ k − 6(kε+ h(ε)).
Corollary 10 can be applied to implementations of
(
2
1
)
-OTk
from Universal OT over bits. Universal OT [21] is a weakened
variant of Bit-OT where a dishonest Bob can choose a chan-
nel PY |X such that H(X0X1|Y ) ≥ α, where (X0, X1) ∈
{0, 1} × {0, 1} are uniform and Y is the output of the
channel PY |X , and learns Y . One choice of a dishonest
Bob is the channel that outputs both inputs with probability
1 − α and one of the inputs, Xc, with probability α. This
primitive can be implemented from randomness (U, V V ′) =
((X0, X1), (C,XC , V
′)), where (U, V ) corresponds to a ran-
domized
(
2
1
)
-OT1 and V ′ = X1−C with probability 1−α and
V ′ = ⊥ otherwise. For this primitve we have H(U |V V ′) ≤ α
and, therefore, for n independent instances H(Un|(V V ′)n) ≤
αn. Thus, Corollary 10 implies that k ≤ αn+ 6(kε+ h(ε)).
As Univeral OT is strictly weaker than this primitive, the same
bound also applies to Universal OT. The protocol proposed in
[35] which implements
(
2
1
)
-OTk from n instances of Universal
OT asymptotically achieves a rate k/n of α [52]. Our lower
bound now shows that this is in fact optimal.
IV. QUANTUM REDUCTIONS: REVERSING STRING OT
EFFICIENTLY
As the bounds of the last section generalize the known
bounds for perfect implementations of OT from [28], [11],
[12], [30] to the statistical case, it is natural to ask whether
similar bounds also hold for quantum protocols, i.e., if the
bounds presented in [53] can be generalized to the statistical
case. We give a negative answer to this question by pre-
senting a statistically secure quantum protocol that violates
these bounds. Thereto we introduce the following function-
ality6 FA→B,kMCOM that can be implemented from FA→B,kOT (i.e.,(
n
1
)
-OTk) as we will show.
Definition 5 (Multi-Commitment): The functionality
FA→B,kMCOM behaves as follows: Upon (the first) input (commit,
b) with b ∈ {0, 1}k from Alice, send committed to Bob.
Upon input (open,T) with T ⊆ [k] from Alice send (open,
bT ) to Bob. All communication/input/output is classical. We
call Alice the sender and Bob the receiver.
An instance of
(
2
1
)
-OTk can be implemented from m =
O(k+κ) bit commitments with an error of 2−Ω(κ) [24], [25],
[26]. In the protocol, Alice sends m BB84-states to Bob who
measures them either in the computational or in the Hadamard
basis. To ensure that he really measures Bob has to commit to
the basis he has measured in and the measurement outcome
for every qubit received. Alice then asks Bob to open a small
subset T of these pairs of commitments. OT can then be
implemented using further classical processing (see Section
VI for a complete description of the protocol). This protocol
implements oblivious transfer that is statistically secure in the
quantum universal composability model [27]. Obviously the
construction remains secure if we replace the commitment
scheme with FA→B,2mMCOM .
Next, we show that FA→B,kMCOM can be implemented from
the oblivious transfer functionality FA→B,kOT (see [27] for a
definition of FA→B,kOT ) using Protocol MCOMfromOT.
As it is done in the proofs of [27], we assume that all
communication between the players is over secure channels
and we only consider static adversaries.
Lemma 7: Protocol MCOMfromOT is statistically secure
and universally composable and realizes FA→B,kMCOM with an
error of 2−κ/2 using κ instances of FA→B,kOT .
Proof: The statement is obviously true in the case of no
corrupted parties and in the case when both the sender and
the receiver are corrupted. We construct for any adversary
A a simulator S that runs a copy of A as a black-box. In
the case where the sender is corrupted, the simulator S can
6In this section we will use the notion commonly used in the UC framework,
that is slightly different from the rest of the paper.
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Protocol MCOMfromOT
Inputs: Alice has an input b = (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ {0, 1}k in
Commit. Bob has an input T ⊆ [k] in Open.
Commit(b):
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ κ:
1) Alice and Bob invoke FA→B,kOT with random inputs
xi0, x
i
1 ∈ {0, 1}k and ci ∈ {0, 1}.
2) Bob receives yi := xici from FA→B,kOT .
3) Alice sends mi := xi0 ⊕ xi1 ⊕ b to Bob.
Open(T):
1) Alice sends bT , T and (xi0)T , (xi1)T for all 1 ≤ i ≤ κ
to Bob.
2) If (mi)T = (xi0 ⊕ xi1 ⊕ bi)T and (yi)T = (xic)T for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ κ, Bob accepts and outputs bT , otherwise
he rejects.
extract the commitment b from the input to FA→B,kOT and
the messages except with probability 2−κ/2 as follows: We
define the extracted commitment as bi := maj(m1i ⊕ x10,i ⊕
x11,i, . . . ,m
κ
i ⊕xκ0,i⊕xκ1,i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k where maj denotes
the majority function. Let T be a (non-empty) subset of [k] and
let b˜ ∈ {0, 1}k such that b˜T 6= bT . An honest receiver accepts
b˜T together with T in Open with probability at most 2−κ/2
as follows: There must exist j ∈ T such that bj 6= b˜j . Then
the sender needs to change either xi0,j or xi1,j for at least κ/2
instances i. Thus, the simulator extracts the bit b in the commit
phase as specified before and gives (commit, b) to FA→B,kMCOM .
Upon getting (b˜T , T ) from the adversary, the simulator gives
(open, T ) to FA→B,kMCOM , if b˜T = bT , otherwise it stops.
Therefore, any environment can distinguish the simulation
and the real execution with an advantage of at most 2−κ/2.
In the case where the receiver is corrupted, the simulator
S, upon getting the message committed from FA→B,kMCOM
and the choice bit ci, chooses the output yi from FA→B,kOT
and the message mi uniformly and independently at random
for all i. In the open phase the simulator S gets (T , bT )
and simulates the messages of an honest sender by setting
(xi1−ci)T := (m
i)T ⊕ (yi)T ⊕ bT and (xici)T := (yi)T for all
i. This simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from the real
execution.
Any protocol that is statistically secure in the classical
universal composability model [54] is also secure in the
quantum universal composability model [27]. Together with
the proofs from [26], [27], we, therefore, obtain the following
theorem.
Theorem 6: There exists a protocol that implements(
2
1
)
-OTk
′
with an error ε from κ = O(log 1/ε) instances
of
(
2
1
)
-OTk in the opposite direction where k′ = Ω(k) if
k = Ω(κ).
Since we can choose k ≫ κ, this immediately implies that
the bound of Corollary 3 does not hold for quantum protocols.
Similar violations can be shown for the other two lower bounds
(given in Corrollary 1). For example, statistically secure and
universally composable7 commitments can be implemented
from shared randomness PUV that is distributed according to
(p)-RabinOT at a rate of H(U |V ) = 1− p [56]. Using The-
orem 11, one can implement FB→A,kOT with k ∈ Ω(n(1 − p))
from n copies of PUV . Since I(U ;V ) = p, quantum protocols
can also violate the bound of Corollary 4.
It has been an open question whether noiseless quantum
communication can increase the commitment capacity [56].
Our example implies a positive answer to this question.
V. IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS FOR QUANTUM OBLIVIOUS
TRANSFER REDUCTIONS
We consider finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces H. A quan-
tum state ρ is a positive semi-definite operator on H satisfying
tr(ρ) = 1. We use the notation ρAB for a state on HA ⊗HB
and define the marginal state ρA := trB ρAB . We use the
symbol 1A to denote either the identity operator on HA or
the identity operator on the states on HA; it should be clear
from the context which one is meant. Given a finite set X
and an orthonormal basis {|x〉 | x ∈ X} of a Hilbert space
HX we can encode a classical probability distribution PX
as a quantum state ρX =
∑
x∈X PX(x)|x〉〈x|. We define
the state corresponding to the uniform distribution on X as
τX := 1|X |
∑
x∈X |x〉〈x|. A state ρXB on HX ⊗ HB is a
classical-quantum or cq-state if it is of the form ρXB =∑
x∈X px|x〉〈x|⊗ρxB . The Hadamard transform is the unitary
described by the matrix H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
in the computational
basis {|0〉, |1〉}. For x, θ ∈ {0, 1}n, we write Hθ|x〉 for the
state Hθ|x〉 = Hθ1 |x1〉 . . .Hθn |xn〉. We also call states of this
form BB84-states. When speaking of the basis θ ∈ {0, 1}n
we mean the basis {Hθ|x〉 | x ∈ {0, 1}n}. For a given
basis {|x1〉, . . . , |xd〉} we say that we measure in basis B to
indicate that we perform a projective measurement given by
the operators Pk = |xk〉〈xk| for all k ∈ [d]. The trace distance
between two quantum states ρ and τ is defined as
D(ρ, τ) := max
E
D(E(ρ), E(τ)) .
where the maximum is over all POVMs and E(ρ) is the proba-
bility distribution of the measurement outcomes. In particular,
for any two cq-states ρXA and σXA, D(ρXA, σXA) ≤ ε
implies that for any measurement G on system A, we have∣∣Pr[G(ρA) = X ]− Pr[G(σA) = X ]∣∣ ≤ ε . (42)
If we choose σXA := τX ⊗ σA, this implies that
Pr[G(ρA) = X ] ≤ 1
2
+ ε . (43)
The conditional von Neumann entropy is defined as
H (A|B)ρ := H (ρAB) −H (ρB) ,
where H(ρ) := tr(−ρ log(ρ)). The Alicki-Fannes inequality
[57] implies that
H (A|B)ρ ≥ (1 − 4ε) · log |A| − 2h(ε) , (44)
7Stand-alone statistically secure commitments based on stateless two-party
primitives are universally composable [55].
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for any state ρAB with D(ρAB, τA ⊗ ρB) ≤ ε. Let ρXB be a
state that is classical on X . If there exists a measurement on
B with outcome X ′ such that Pr[X ′ 6= X ] ≤ ε, then
H (X |B)ρ ≤ H (X |X ′) ≤ h(ε) + ε · log |X | . (45)
Let ρABC be a tripartite state. Subadditivity and the triangle
inequality [58] imply that
H (A|BC)ρ ≥ H (A|B)ρ − 2H (C)ρ . (46)
The conditional entropy H (A|B)ρ can decrease by at most
log |Z| when conditioning on an additional classical system
Z , i.e., for any tripartite state ρABZ that is classical on Z
with respect to some orthonormal basis {|z〉}z∈Z , we have
H (A|BZ)ρ ≥ H (A|B)ρ − log |Z| . (47)
The next lemma can be obtained by applying the asymptotic
equipartition property to the corresponding lemma for the
smoothed min-entropy in [59]. It shows that the entropy
H (A|BC)ρ cannot increase too much when a projective
measurement is applied to system C.
Lemma 8: Let ρABC be a tri-partite state. Furthermore, let
M be a projective measurement in the basis {|z〉}z∈Z on C
and ρABZ := (1AB ⊗M)(ρABC). Then,
H (A|BC)ρ ≥ H (A|BZ)ρ − log |Z| .
A. Security Definition
A protocol is an ε-secure implementation of OT in the
malicious model if for any adversary A attacking the protocol
(real setting), there exists a simulator S using the ideal OT
(ideal setting) such that for all inputs of the honest players
the real and the ideal setting can be distinguished with an
advantage of at most ε. This definition implies the following
three conditions (see also [60]):
• Correctness: If both players are honest, Alice has random
inputs (X0, X1) ∈ {0, 1}k × {0, 1}k and Bob has input
c ∈ {0, 1}, then Bob always receives Xc in the ideal
setting. This implies that in an ε-secure protocol, Bob
must output a value Y , where
Pr[Y 6= Xc] ≤ ε . (48)
• Security for Alice: Let Alice be honest and Bob ma-
licious, and let Alice’s input be chosen uniformly at
random. In the ideal setting, the simulator must provide
the ideal OT with a classical input C′ ∈ {0, 1}. He
receives the output Y and then outputs a quantum state
σB that may depend on C′ and Y . The output of the
simulator together with classical values X0, X1 and C′
now defines the state σX0X1BC′ . Since X1−C′ is random
and independent of C′ and Y , we must have
σX
1−C′XC′BC
′ = π{0,1}k ⊗ σXC′BC′ (49)
and
D(σX0X1B, ρX0X1B) ≤ ε , (50)
where ρX0X1B is the resulting state of the protocol.8
• Security for Bob: If Bob is honest and Alice malicious,
the simulator outputs a quantum state σA that is inde-
pendent of Bob’s input c. Let ρcA be the state that Alice
has at the end of the protocol if Bob’s input is c. The
security definition now requires that D(σA, ρcA) ≤ ε for
c ∈ {0, 1}. By the triangle inequality, we get
D(ρ0A, ρ
1
A) ≤ 2ε . (51)
Note that the Conditions (48) - (51) are only necessary for
the security of a protocol, they do not imply that a protocol
is secure.
In the following we present two impossibility results for
quantum protocols that implement
(
2
1
)
-OTk using a bit com-
mitment functionality or randomness distributed to the players.
We consider protocols which are information-theoretically se-
cure. In particular, we assume that the adversary has unlimited
memory space and can apply arbitrary quantum operations to
his whole quantum system. Our proofs use similar techniques
as the impossibility results in [37], [38], [39].
We assume that the two parties, Alice and Bob, have access
to a noiseless quantum and a noiseless classical channel.
The protocol proceeds in rounds, where in any round of
the protocol, the parties may perform an arbitrary quantum
operation on the system in their possession. This operation
can be conditioned on the available classical information and
generates the inputs to the communication channels. The
quantum channel transfers a part of one party’s system to
the other party. The classical channel measures the input in a
canonical basis and sends the outcome of the measurement to
the receiver. We assume that the total number of rounds of the
protocol is bounded by a finite number. Since we can always
introduce empty rounds, this corresponds to the assumption
that the number of rounds is equal in every execution of the
protocol.
All quantum operations of both parties can be purified
by introducing an additional memory space: Any quantum
operation E can be simulated by adding an ancillary system,
applying a unitary on the composite system, and then tracing
out part of the remaining system. More precisely, for any
TP-CPM E from S=(HA) to S=(HB), there exists a Hilbert
space HR, a unitary U acting on HABR and a pure state
σBR ∈ S=(HBR) such that
E(ρA) = trAR(U(ρA ⊗ σBR)U †). (52)
This is known as the Stinespring dilation [61] of E . Thus, we
can assume that the parties apply in every round of the protocol
a unitary to their system conditioned on the information shared
over the classical channel. In particular, we can assume that the
system remains in a pure state conditioned on the information
shared over the classical channel if the initial state of the
protocol is pure. Since a malicious player can purify all his
8The standard security definition of OT considered here requires Bob’s
choice bit to be fixed at the end of the protocol. To show that a protocol
is insecure, it suffices, therefore, to show that Bob can still choose after the
termination of the protocol whether he wants to receive x0 or x1. Lo in [39]
shows impossibility of OT in a stronger sense, namely that Bob can learn all
of Alice’s inputs.
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quantum operations in the original protocol without being
detected, the purified protocol is secure according to our
definition if the original protocol is secure.
An important tool in our impossibility proofs is the fol-
lowing technical lemma from [59], which generalizes a result
already used in [37], [38], [39].
Lemma 9: For b ∈ {0, 1}, let
ρbXX′AB =
∑
x
Pb(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |x〉〈x|X′ ⊗ |ψx,bAB〉〈ψx,bAB |
with D(ρ0X′B, ρ1X′B) ≤ ε. Then there exists a unitary UAX
such that
D(ρ′1XX′AB, ρ
1
XX′AB) ≤
√
2ε
where ρ′1XX′AB = (UXA ⊗ 1X′B)ρ0XX′AB(UXA ⊗ 1X′B)†.
First, we consider protocols where the players can use a
certain number n of ideal bit commitments as a resource to
implement an oblivious transfer.
Theorem 7: Any protocol that implements a
(
2
1
)
-OTk with
an error of at most ε , where 0 ≤ ε ≤ 0.002, from black-box
bit commitments, has to use at least (1 − 3√ε) · k − 3h(√ε)
bit commitments.
Proof: Let nA be the number of bit commitments from
Alice to Bob and nB the number of bit commitments from
Bob to Alice used in the protocol and n = nA + nB . Let
Alice choose her inputs X0 and X1 uniformly at random. Let
the final state of the protocol on Alice’s and Bob’s system be
ρcAB , when both players are honest and Bob has input c ∈
{0, 1}. If Bob is executing the protocol honestly using input
c = 1, he can compute X1 with an error of at most 1 − ε.
Since the protocol is ε-secure for Alice, we can conclude from
Lemma 20 that D(ρ1X0B, τX0 ⊗ ρ1B) ≤ 5ε . Equation (44)
implies that
H (X0|B)ρ1 ≥ (1− 20ε) · k − 10h(ε) . (53)
In the following, we consider a modified protocol that does
not use the bit commitment functionality and is not necessarily
secure for Alice. In this protocol we make Bob more pow-
erful in the sense that he can simulate the original protocol
locally. Thus, the modified protocol is still secure for Bob.
Furthermore, the resulting state is pure conditioned on the
classical communication. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 9
to derive an upper bound on the entropy of X0 conditioned on
Bob’s system in the new protocol. Finally, we use the data-
processing inequalities for the conditional entropy to show that
this entropy can have decreased in the modified protocol by
at most the number of commitments, which, together with
inequality (44), implies the statement of the theorem.
In the modified protocol, Alice, instead of sending bits to the
commitment functionality, measures the bits to be committed,
stores a copy of each and sends them to Bob, who stores them
in a classical register, CA. When one of these commitments is
opened, he moves the corresponding bit to his register B. Bob
simulates the action of the commitment functionality locally
as follows: Instead of measuring a register, Y , and sending
the outcome to the commitment functionality, he applies the
isometry U : |y〉Y 7→ |yy〉Y Y ′ purifying the measurement of
the committed bit and stores Y ′ in another register, CB . When
Bob has to open the commitment, he measures Y ′ and sends
the outcome to Alice over the classical channel. The state
of the modified protocol is pure conditioned on the classical
communication. Let ρcABC , where C stands for CACB , be the
final state of this protocol. Note that its marginal state ρcAB
is the corresponding state at the end of the original protocol.
Since the protocol is ε-secure for Bob, we have D(ρ0A, ρ1A) ≤
2ε. From Lemma 9 follows that there exists a unitary UBC
such that Bob can transform the state ρ1 into the state ρ¯0 with
D(ρ0, ρ¯0) ≤ 2√ε. Since given the state ρ0X0B , X0 can be
guessed from ρ0B with probability 1− ε, it follows from (42)
that X0 can be guessed from ρ1BC with a probability of at
least 1− ε− 2√ε. By inequality (45), we obtain
H (X0|B)ρ1 ≤ h(ε) + h(2
√
ε) + (ε+ 2
√
ε) · k . (54)
We can use Lemma 8 and inequality (47) to conclude that
H (X0|BCACB)ρ1 ≥ H (X0|B)ρ1 − n .
For ε ≤ 0.002, we have h(√ε) > 11h(ε) and 21ε < √ε. This
implies the statement.
Theorem 7 implies that there exists a constant c > 0 such
that any protocol that implements m+1 bit commitments from
m bit commitments must have an error of at least c/m, i.e.,
bit commitment cannot be extended by quantum protocols.
This result can be generalized in the following sense: For
any protocol that implements a single string commitment
from a certain number of bit commitments, the length of the
implemented string commitments is essentially bounded by
the number of used bit commitments, even if the protocol is
allowed to have a small constant error [59].
Next, we consider protocols where the two players have ac-
cess to distributed randomness PUV . We can model this prim-
itive as a quantum primitive
∑
u,v
√
PUV (u, v) · |u, v〉UV ⊗
|u, v〉E that distributes the values u and v to Alice and Bob
and keeps the register E.
Theorem 8: To implement a
(
2
1
)
-OTk with an error of at
most ε, where 0 ≤ ε ≤ 0.002, from a primitive PUV , we need
Hmax(U |V ) +Hmax(V |U) ≥ (1− 3
√
ε) · k − 3h(√ε) ,
and
2H (UV ) ≥ (1 − 3√ε) · k − 3h(√ε) .
Proof: Let the final state of the protocol on Alice’s and
Bob’s system be ρcAB , when both players are honest and Bob
has input c ∈ {0, 1}. As in the proof of the previous theorem
we have
H (X0|B)ρ1 ≥ (1−20ε) ·k−2h(5ε) ≥ (1−20ε) ·k−10h(ε) .
Consider a modified protocol that starts from a state
|ψ〉UV U ′V ′ =
∑
u,v
√
PUV (u, v) · |u, v〉UV ⊗ |u, v〉U ′V ′ ,
where the systems V and U ′V ′ belong to Bob. Again Bob
is more powerful in the modified protocol because he can
simulate the state of the original protocol locally. As in (54) in
the proof of the previous theorem we can, therefore, conclude
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that
H (X0|BU ′V ′)ρ1 ≤ h(ε) + h(2
√
ε) + (ε+ 2
√
ε) · k .
Since measuring register V ′ and discarding register U ′ results
in the state ρ1X0B , we can use Lemma 8 and inequality (47)
to obtain
H (X0|BU ′V ′)ρ1 ≥H (X0|B)ρ1 −max
v
log |supp(PU|V=v)|
−max
u
log |supp(PV |U=u)| .
This implies the first statement. The second statement follows
from the inequality
H (X0|BB′)ρ1 ≥ H (X0|B)ρ1 −H (B′) , (55)
which is implied by (46).
The theorem immediately implies the following corollary.
Corollary 12: To implement a
(
2
1
)
-OTk with an error of at
most ε, where 0 ≤ ε ≤ 0.002, from n instances of (21)-OT1
in either direction, we must have
2n ≥ (1− 3√ε) · k − 3h(√ε) .
Theorem 8 implies that
(
2
1
)
-OT1 cannot be extended by
quantum protocols in the following sense: Given a protocol
that implements m+1 instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1 from m instances
of
(
2
1
)
-OT1 with an error ε, we can apply this protocol
iteratively and implement 4m instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1 from m
instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1 with an error of ε′ := 3mε, assuming
that Bob follows the protocol. Thus, Corollary 12 implies that
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√
ε′+3h(
√
ε′)/m ≥ 2 if ε′ ≤ 0.002. Thus, ε′ ≥ 0.002 and
ε ≥ 11500m . Hence, any quantum protocol that implements
m + 1 instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1 from m instances of
(
2
1
)
-OT1
must have an error of at least 11500m .
The second bound of Theorem 8 also holds for more gen-
eral primitives that generate a pure state |ψ〉ABE , distributes
registers A and B to Alice and Bob and keeps the purification
in its register E.
Theorem 9: To implement a
(
2
1
)
-OTk with an error of at
most ε, where 0 ≤ ε ≤ 0.002, from a primitive |ψ〉ABE , we
need
2H (E)ψ ≥ (1 − 3
√
ε) · k − 3h(√ε) .
The proof of Theorem 9 follows exactly the same reasoning
as Theorem 8 and is omitted.
Next, we give an additional lower bound for reductions of
OT to commitments that shows that the number of commit-
ments (of arbitrary size) used in any ε-secure protocol must be
at least Ω(log(1/ε)). We model the commitments as before,
i.e., the functionality applies the isometry U : |y〉Y 7→ |yy〉Y Y ′
and stores Y Y ′ in separate registers EA and EB for Alice and
Bob. The proof idea is the following: We let the adversary
guess a subset T of commitments that he will be required to
open during the protocol. He honestly executes all commit-
ments in T , but cheats in all others. If the adversary guesses
T right, he is able to cheat in the same way as in any protocol
that does not use any commitments.
Theorem 10: Any quantum protocol that implements(
2
1
)
-OTk using κ commitments (of arbitrary length) must have
an error of at least 2−κ/36.
Proof: We define ε := 2−κ/36. Let ρcABEAEB be the final
state of an ε-secure protocol, when both players are honest and
Bob has input c ∈ {0, 1}. We distinguish two cases. In the
first case, we assume that D(ρ0AEA , ρ
1
AEA
) ≥ ε′ := 1/18 .
We let Bob be honest and let Alice apply the following
strategy: She chooses a random subset T of [k]. She executes
all commitments in T honestly, but for all commitments not
in T she sends |0〉 to EA and simulates the action of the
commitment functionality in her quantum register. Otherwise,
she follows the whole protocol honestly.
During the execution of the protocol, Bob may ask Alice to
open a certain set of commitments, T ′. If T ′ = T , which
happens with probability 2−κ independently of everything
else, then at the end of the protocol the global state is ρc,
but EA is now part of Alice’s system. Thus, the states of
Alice’s system for c = 0 and c = 1, have distance at least
ε′ · 2−κ > 2ε, which contradicts condition (51).
In the second case, we assume that D(ρ0AEA , ρ
1
AEA
) < ε′.
From condition (48) follows that honest Bob can guess X1
with probability 1− ε if c = 1. According to Lemma 20, X0
should be 5ε-close to uniform with respect to ρ1B . To obtain a
contradiction to the security condition (50), it is according to
equation (43) sufficient to show that Bob can guess the first
bit of X0 with a probability greater than 1/2 + 5ε.
Again, if Bob guesses the set T right, then EB is part of
Bob’s system. Then Lemma 9 guarantees the existence of a
unitary UBEB such Bob can transform the state ρ1 into a state
ρ¯1 with D(ρ0, ρ¯1) ≤
√
2ε′. Thus, Bob can guess X0 with an
error of at most
√
2ε′+ ε given ρ¯1. If he fails to guess T , he
simply outputs a random bit as his guess for the first bit of X0.
Since the probability that he guesses the subset T correctly is
exactly 2−κ, he can guess the first bit of X0 with probability
(1− 2−κ) · 1
2
+ 2−κ · (1− ε−
√
2ε′)
=
1
2
+ 2−κ ·
(
1
2
− ε−
√
2ε′
)
>
1
2
+ 2−κ ·
(
1
2
− ε′/2−
√
2ε′
)
=
1
2
+ 2−κ · 5
36
=
1
2
+ 5ε .
VI. REDUCTION OF OT TO STRING COMMITMENTS
We will now show how to construct a protocol that is
optimal with respect to the lower bounds of both Theorem 7
and Theorem 10.
We modify the protocol from [24] by grouping the m pairs
of values into κ blocks of size b := m/κ. We let Bob commit
to the blocks of b pairs of values at once. The subset T is
now of size ακ, and defines the blocks to be opened by Bob.
If Bob is able to open all commitments in T correctly, then
the state of the protocol must be close in a certain sense
to the state that would result from correctly measuring all
qubits. Since we consider security in the malicious model, a
dishonest player may abort the protocol by not sending any
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Protocol OTfromCommitment
1) Alice prepares m EPR pairs, (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2, and
sends one qubit of each pair to Bob. Bob selects θˆ ∈
{0, 1}m at random and measures the received qubits
in basis θˆ, obtaining xˆ ∈ {0, 1}m. Alice chooses a
basis θ ∈ {0, 1}m at random (but does not measure
her qubits yet).
2) Bob commits in blocks of size b to θˆ and xˆ. Alice
samples a random subset t ⊆ [κ] of cardinality
ακ and asks Bob to open the commitments to the
corresponding blocks of values (θˆi, xˆi). Let T be the
set of bits in [m] corresponding to t. Alice measures
her qubits indexed by T in Bob’s basis θˆt to obtain
xt and verifies that xi = xˆi whenever θi = θˆi. If
Bob does not commit to all values as required or
does not open all commitments or if Alice detects
an inconsistency, Alice outputs outputs two random
k-bit strings z0, z1 and terminates the protocol.
3) (Set partitioning) Alice sends θ to Bob. Bob par-
titions T¯ := [m] \ T into the subsets Ic = {i ∈
T¯ : θi = θˆi} and I1−c = {i ∈ T¯ : θi 6= θˆi}
and sends I0 and I1 to Alice. Additionally, Alice
measures her qubits in basis θ to obtain x.
4) (Key extraction) Alice chooses and sends to Bob
two-universal hash functions f0, f1 with output
length k, and computes z0 := f0(xI0 ) and z1 :=
f1(xI1 ). Bob computes zc = f(xˆI0).
message. A possibility to handle this would be to include a
special output aborted to the definition of the primitive.
Here, we take the following, different approach, which is also
used, for example, in [62]: Whenever a player does not send a
(well-formed) message, the other player assumes that a fixed
default message as, for example, the all-zero string has been
sent. Note that our protocol is different from the protocols
analyzed in [26], [63]. Besides replacing the bit commitments
by strings commitments, Alice outputs two random strings if
Bob aborts in the commitment or in the check step. This allows
us to implement an ideal OT functionality that does not have
a special output aborted.
We only need to estimate the error probability of the clas-
sical sampling strategy that corresponds to the new checking
procedure of Alice and apply the result from [63]. We need the
following sampling result, which follows from the inequalities
in [64] (the proof is given in Appendix C).
Lemma 10: Let α ∈ [0, 12 ]. Let y = (y1, . . . ym) be a bit
string of length m := bκ that we group into κ blocks of
size b. Let T ∗ be a random subset of [κ] of size ακ, T the
corresponding set of bits in [m] and T¯ the complement of
T . Let T ′ be a random subset of T , where every element
is chosen to be in T ′ with probability 12 , independently of
everything else. We have for any δ > 0
Pr
[
1
|T ′|
∑
i∈T ′
yi ≤ 1
(1− α)m
∑
i∈T¯
yi − δ
]
≤ ε ,
where ε := 3 exp(−(1/2− ε)ακδ2/2).
Lemma 11 (Security for Alice): Let Z0 and Z1 be the
strings from {0, 1}k output by Alice. Then there exists a binary
C such that for any ε, δ > 0 the following upper bound on
the distance from uniform of Z1−C with respect to ZC and
Bob’s system holds:
D(ρZ1−CZCEC , τ{0,1}k⊗ρZCEC)
≤ 2− 12 (( 14−ε/2−h(δ))(1−α)m−k)−1
+ 2 exp(−2ε2(1− α)m)
+
√
3 exp(−α′κδ2/4) , (56)
where E denotes the quantum state output by Bob, 1 the
identity operator on C2k and α′ := (1/2− δ)α.
Proof: We consider the state shared between Alice and
Bob after Bob has committed to the bases θˆ and the measure-
ment outcomes xˆ where we can assume θˆ = xˆ = (0, . . . , 0).
Since we want to prove an upper bound on (56), we can
assume that Bob always opens all commitments. Otherwise
the distance from uniform can only decrease. Alice now
chooses a subset T to be opened by Bob. As in the proof of
Theorem 4 from [65], Lemma 10 implies that the joint state
is
√
3 exp(−α′κδ2/4)-close to an ideal state that is for every
choice of T and S in a superposition of states with relative
Hamming weight in a δ-neighbourhood of β within AT¯ , where
β is the ratio of inconsistencies that Alice detects and S is
the subset of T that Alice checks. We assume that the state
equals this ideal state and add the error later. Then, following
the proof of Theorem 4 in [63] for β = 0, we obtain that the
distance from uniform of one of the outputs with respect to
Bob’s system (given the other output) is bounded from above
by
2−
1
2
(( 1
4
−ε/2−h(δ))(1−α)m−k)−1 + 2 exp(−2ε2(1 − α)m) .
If β > 0, the distance from uniform is zero. Thus, the
statement follows by adding the distance of the ideal state
to the real state.
Lemma 12 (Security for Bob): The protocol is perfectly se-
cure for Bob.
Proof: Let ρA′Y C be the state created by the protocol
if Bob is honest. We consider a hypothetical protocol where
Bob does not use any commitments. He stores all the qubits
received from Alice. After Alice sends the set T , he chooses a
basis θˆ and measures his qubits corresponding to T to obtain
xˆT in basis θ, but does not yet measure the other qubits. Then
he sends xˆT and θˆT to Alice. After he gets the basis θ from
Alice he measures all his remaining qubits in Alice’s basis
θ to obtain xˆT¯ . Next, he chooses his input C ∈ {0, 1} and
constructs the sets I0 and I1 using θ and θˆ as in the protocol.
After receiving f0, f1 ∈ F from Alice, he computes z0 =
f0(xˆI0) and z1 = f1(xˆI1 ) . This results in a state σA′Z0Z1C ,
where Z0 and Z1 are the values computed by Bob. We have
σA′Z0Z1C = σA′Z0Z1 ⊗ σC and σA′ZCC = ρA′Y C .
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Lemma 13 (Correctness): The protocol is perfectly correct.
Proof: If both players are honest, then Z0, Z1 and
C are independently distributed according to the required
distributions. Furthermore, Bob always computes ZC as his
output.
The following theorem is then immediately implied by
Lemmas 11, 12 and 13.
Theorem 11: There exists a quantum protocol that uses
κ = O(log 1/ε) commitments of size b, where κb = O(k +
log 1/ε), and implements a
(
2
1
)
-OTk with an error of at most ε.
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APPENDIX A
MALICIOUS OT IMPLIES SEMI-HONEST OT
In the malicious model the adversary is not required to
follow the protocol. Therefore, a protocol that is secure in
the malicious model protects against a much bigger set of
adversaries. On the other hand, the security definition in
the malicious model only implies that for any (also semi-
honest) adversary there exists a malicious simulator for the
ideal primitive, i.e., the simulator is allowed to change his
input or output from the ideal primitive. Since this is not
allowed in the semi-honest model, security in the malicious
model does not imply security in the semi-honest model in
general. For implementations of OT9, however, it has been
shown in [66] that this implication does hold, because if the
adversary is semi-honest, a simulator can only change the input
with small probability. Otherwise, he is not able to correctly
simulate the input or the output of the protocol. Therefore,
any impossibility result for OT in the semi-honest model also
implies impossibility in the malicious model.
We will state these result for
(
n
1
)
-OTk with explicit bounds
on the errors.
Lemma A.1: If a protocol implementing
(
n
1
)
-OTk is secure
in the malicious model with an error of at most ε, then it is
also secure in the semi-honest model with an error of at most
(2n+ 1)ε.
Proof: From the security of the protocol we know that
there exists a (malicious) simulator that simulates the view
of honest Alice. If two honest players execute the protocol
on input (x0, . . . , xn−1) and c, then with probability 1 − ε
the receiver gets y = xc. Thus, the simulator can change the
input xi with probability at most 2ε for all 0 ≤ i < n− 1. We
construct a new simulator that executes the malicious simulator
but never changes the input. This simulation is (2n+1)ε-close
to the distribution of the protocol. From the security of the
protocol we also know that there exists a (malicious) simulator
that simulates the view of honest Bob. If two honest players
execute the protocol with uniform input (X0, . . . , Xn−1) and
choice bit c, then with probability 1− ε the receiver gets y =
xc. If the simulator changes the choice bit c, he does not learn
9And any other so-called deviation revealing functionality.
xc and the simulated y is not equal to xc with probability
at least 1/2. Therefore, the simulator can change c or the
output with probability at most 4ε. As above we can construct
a simulator for the semi-honest model with an error of at most
5ε.
Note that some of our proofs could easily be adapted to the
malicious model to get slightly better bounds than the ones
that follow from the combination of the bounds in the semi-
honest model and Lemma A.1.
APPENDIX B
SMOOTH ENTROPIES
In the following we prove different properties of the en-
tropies Hεmin(X |Y ) and Hεmax(X |Y ). Note that some of these
properties (or special cases of them) have already been shown
in [46].
We first introduce the following auxiliary quantities.
Definition 6: For random variables X,Y and ε ∈ [0, 1), we
define
rεmax(X |Y ) := min
Ω:Pr[Ω]≥1−ε
max
y∈Y
|supp (PXΩ|Y=y)| and
rεmin(X |Y ) := min
Ω:Pr[Ω]≥1−ε
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)max
x
PXΩ|Y=y(x) .
Note that Hεmin(X |Y ) = − log rεmin(X |Y ) and
Hεmax(X |Y ) = log rεmax(X |Y ).
The following lemma shows that the smooth conditional
max-entropy is subadditive.
Lemma 14 (Subadditivity): Let X,Y, Z be random vari-
ables and ε, ε′ ≥ 0 such that ε+ ε′ ∈ [0, 1). Then
Hε+ε
′
max (XY |Z) ≤ Hεmax(X |Z) +Hε
′
max(Y |XZ) .
Proof: Let Ω be an event with Pr[Ω] ≥ 1− ε and
max
x,z
|supp (PY Ω|X=x,Z=z)| ≤ rεmax(Y |XZ) .
Let Ω′ be an event with Pr[Ω′] ≥ 1− ε′ and Ω′ ↔ (X,Z)↔
(Y,Ω) such that
max
z
|supp (PXΩ′|Z=z)| ≤ rεmax(X |Z) .
Then Pr[Ω,Ω′] ≥ 1− ε− ε′ and
rε+ε
′
max (XY |Z) ≤ maxz |supp (PXY ΩΩ′|Z=z)| .
We have
max
z
|supp (PXY ΩΩ′|Z=z)|
≤ max
z
(|supp (PXΩ′|Z=z)| ·max
x
|supp (PY Ω|X=x,Z=z)|)
≤ max
z
|supp (PXΩ′|Z=z)| ·max
x,z
|supp (PY Ω|X=x,Z=z)| .
Next, we show that conditioning on an additional random
variable cannot reduce the conditional smooth entropies.
Lemma 15: Let X,Y, Z be random variables and ε ∈ [0, 1).
Then
Hεmin(X |Z) ≥ Hεmin(X |Y Z) .
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Proof: Let Ω be an event with Pr[Ω] ≥ 1− ε. Then∑
z
PZ(z)max
x
PXΩ|Z=z(x)
=
∑
z
PZ(z)max
x
∑
y
PY |Z=z(y)PXΩ|Y=y,Z=z(x)
≤
∑
z
PZ(z)max
x,y
PXΩ|Y=y,Z=z(x) .
The Shannon entropy satisfies the inequality H(X |Z) −
H(X |Y Z) = I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ H(Y |Z). The next lemma shows
that this property can be generalized to the smooth min- and
max-entropy.
Lemma 16: Let X,Y, Z be random variables and ε, ε′ ≥ 0
such that ε+ ε′ ∈ [0, 1). Then
Hεmin(X |Z)−Hε
′
max(X |Y Z) ≤ Hε+ε
′
min (Y |Z) .
Proof: Let Ω be an event with Pr[Ω] ≥ 1− ε and∑
z
max
x
PXZΩ(x, z) ≤ rεmin(X |Z) .
Let Ω′ be an event with Pr[Ω′] ≥ 1− ε′ such that
max
y,z
|supp (PXΩ′|Y=y,Z=z)| ≤ rεmax(X |Y Z) .
Then Pr[Ω,Ω′] ≥ 1− ε− ε′ and
rε+ε
′
min (Y |Z) ≤
∑
z
PZ(z)max
y
PY ΩΩ′|Z=z(y) .
We have for all z
max
x,y
PXY ΩΩ′|Z=z(x, y) ≤ max
x,y
PXYΩ|Z=z(x, y)
≤ max
x
PXΩ|Z=z(x) .
Furthermore, we have
|{x : PXY ΩΩ′|Z=z(x, y) > 0}| ≤ |supp (PXΩ′|Y=y,Z=z)| .
Together, we obtain
rε+ε
′
min (Y |Z) ≤
∑
z
PZ(z)max
y
PY ΩΩ′|Z=z(y)
=
∑
z
PZ(z)(max
y
∑
x
PXY ΩΩ′|Z=z(x, y))
≤
∑
z
PZ(z)(max
y,z
|supp (PXΩΩ′|Y=y,Z=z)|
·max
x,y
PXY ΩΩ′|Z=z(x, y))
≤ max
y,z
|supp (PXΩ′|Y=y,Z=z)|
·
∑
z
PZ(z)max
x
PXΩ|Z=z(x)
≤ rεmin(X |Z) · rε
′
max(X |Y Z) .
Note that the proof also implies the stronger inequality
Hεmin(XY |Z) − Hε
′
max(X |Y Z) ≤ Hε+ε
′
min (Y |Z), which cor-
responds in a certain sense to the inequality H(X |Z) −
H(X |Y Z) ≤ H(XY |Z) for the Shannon entropy.
The following lemma shows that the smooth min-entropy
Hεmin(X |Y ) satisfies a data processing inequality, i.e., it
cannot be decreased by additionally processing Y .
Lemma 17 (Data Processing): Let X,Y, Z be random vari-
ables with X ↔ Y ↔ Z and ε ∈ [0, 1). Then
Hεmin(X |Y ) ≤ Hεmin(X |Y Z) .
Proof: Let Ω be an event with Pr[Ω] ≥ 1 − ε and Ω ↔
XY ↔ Z such that
rεmin(X |Y ) =
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PXΩ|Y=y(x) .
We have
PXΩ|Y=y,Z=z(x) = PX|Y=y,Z=z(x)PΩ|X=x,Y=y,Z=z
= PX|Y=y(x)PΩ|X=x,Y=y
= PXΩ|Y=y(x) .
Thus, we obtain
rεmin(X |Y Z) ≤
∑
y,z
PY Z(y, z)max
x
PXΩ|Y=y,Z=z(x)
=
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PXΩ|Y=y(x) .
The smooth max-entropy Hεmax(X |Y ) also satisfies a data
processing inequality, i.e., it cannot be decreased by addition-
ally processing Y .
Lemma 18: Let X,Y, Z be random variables with X ↔
Y ↔ Z and ε ∈ [0, 1). Then
Hεmax(X |Y ) ≤ Hεmax(X |Y Z) .
Proof: Let Ω be an event such that
rεmax(X |Y Z) = maxy,z |supp (PXΩ|Y=y,Z=z)| .
For all y, we define εy := PΩ|Y=y . Let Ωy be an event such
that
rεymax(X |Z, Y = y) = max
z
|supp (PXΩy |Y=y,Z=z)| .
Let z¯y be such that PΩy|Y=y,Z=z¯ is maximal. We define
Ω¯y with PΩ¯y |X=x,Y=y := PΩy|X=x,Y=y,Z=z¯ . Then, we have
PΩ¯y|Y=y ≥ PΩy |Y=y ≥ 1 − εy and PXΩy|Y=y,Z=z ≥
PXΩy|Y=y,Z=z¯ = PXΩ¯y |Y=y and, therefore,
rεymax(X |Z, Y = y) ≥ rεymax(X |Y = y) .
Thus, we get
rεmax(X |Y Z) = maxy,z |supp (PXΩ|Y=y,Z=z)|
≥ max
y
rεymax(X |Z, Y = y)
≥ max
y
rεymax(X |Y = y)
≥ rεmax(X |Y ) .
The smooth max-entropy satisfies the following monotonic-
ity properties.
Lemma 19: Let X,Y, Z be random variables and ε ∈ [0, 1).
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Then
Hεmax(XY |Z) ≥ Hεmax(X |Z) ≥ Hεmax(X |Y Z) .
Proof: Let Ω be an event with Pr[Ω] ≥ 1 − ε. Then the
first inequality follows from
max
z
|supp (PXY Ω|Z=z)| ≥ max
z
|supp (PXΩ|Z=z)| .
and the second inequality from
max
y,z
|supp (PXΩ|Y=y,Z=z)| ≤ max
z
|supp (PXΩ|Z=z)| .
APPENDIX C
TECHNICAL LEMMAS
Lemma 1. Let (X,Y ) and (Xˆ, Yˆ ) be random variables dis-
tributed according to PXY and PXˆYˆ , and let D(PXY , PXˆYˆ ) ≤
ǫ. Then
H(Xˆ|Yˆ ) ≥ H(X |Y )− ǫ log |X | − h(ǫ) .
Proof: There exist random variables A,B such that
PXY |A=0 = PXˆYˆ |B=0 and Pr[A = 0] = Pr[B = 0] = 1 − ǫ.
Thus, using the monotonicity of the entropy and the fact that
H(X |Y B = 1) ≤ log |X | we get that
H(Xˆ|Yˆ ) ≥ (1− ε)H(Xˆ|Yˆ A = 0) + εH(Xˆ|Yˆ A = 1)
≥ (1− ǫ)H(X |Y B = 0)
= H(X |Y B)− ǫH(X |Y B = 1)
= H(XB|Y )−H(B|Y )− ǫH(X |Y B = 1)
≥ H(X |Y )− h(ǫ)− ǫ log |X | .
Lemma 20: Let ρX0X1B satisfy conditions (49) and (50).
If there exists a measurement G on system B such that
Pr[G(ρB) = X1] ≥ 1− ε, then
D(ρX0X1B, τX0 ⊗ ρX1B) ≤ 5ε .
Proof: Let σX0X1BC′ be the state in conditions (49)
and (50). Then (43) implies
Pr[G(σB) = X1] ≥ Pr[G(ρB) = X1]− ε ≥ 1− 2ε .
In the state σX0X1BC′ , we can guess the first bit of X1−C′
if we output the first bit of G(σB) whenever C′ = 0 and a
random bit otherwise. We succeed with a probability of
g ≥1
2
· Pr[C′ = 1] + Pr[G(σB) = X1 ∧C′ = 0]
=
1
2
· (1− Pr[C′ = 0]) + Pr[C′ = 0]− Pr[G(σB) 6= X1 ∧C′ = 0]
≥1
2
· (1− Pr[C′ = 0]) + Pr[C′ = 0]− 2ε
=
1
2
+
Pr[C′ = 0]
2
− 2ε .
Since X1−C′ is uniform with respect to the rest, we have
g ≤ 12 and, therefore, Pr[C′ = 0] ≤ 4ε. This implies that for
σˆX0X1BC′ := τX0 ⊗ σX1B ⊗ |1〉〈1| we have
D(σX
1−C′XC′BC
′ , σˆX
1−C′XC′BC
′) ≤ 4ε
and hence
D(ρX0X1B, τX0 ⊗ ρX1B) ≤ D(ρX0X1B, σX0X1B)
+ D(σX0X1B , σˆX0X1B)
≤ 5ε .
We will use the following lemma from [64] to prove Lemma
10.
Lemma 21: Let β = (β1, · · · , βn) ∈ [0, 1]n. Let
X1, · · · , Xk denote a random sample with replacement and
let Y1, · · · , Yk denote a random sample without replacement
from β. Then the following two inequalities hold
Pr
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
Xi ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
βi − ε
]
≤ e−2kε2 ,
Pr
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
Yi ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
βi − ε
]
≤ e−2kε2 .
Proof of Lemma 10: Let aj be the number of bits where
y is equal to 1 in the jth block, for j ∈ [κ], and let T¯ ∗ be the
complement of T ∗. We set βj := 1− aj/b. Then all βj are in
[0, 1]. Thus, we can apply Lemma 21 to obtain
Pr

 1
(1− α)m
∑
i∈T¯
yi ≥ 1
m
m∑
i=1
yi + ε


= Pr

 1
(1− α)m
∑
j∈T¯ ∗
aj ≥ 1
m
κ∑
j=1
aj + ε


≤ e−2(1−α)κε2 . (57)
Let S ∈ {0, . . . , αm} be the size of T ′. Even if we condition
on the event that T ′ has size s, i.e, S = s, T ′ is still a
random subset of [m]. Hence, we can apply Lemma 21 again
and obtain
Pr
[
1
s
∑
i∈T ′
yi ≤ 1
m
m∑
i=1
yi − ε
∣∣∣S = s
]
≤ e−2sε2 ,
which implies that
Pr
[
1
S
∑
i∈T ′
yi ≤ 1
m
m∑
i=1
yi − ε
∣∣∣S ≥ α′m
]
≤ e−2α′mε2 ,
where α′ := (1/2− ε)α. From Lemma 21 follows that
Pr[S ≤ α′m] = Pr
[
S
αm
≤ 1
2
− ε
]
≤ e−2αmε2 .
Hence,
Pr
[
1
S
∑
i∈T ′
yi ≤ 1
m
m∑
i=1
yi − ε
]
≤ e−2αmε2 + e−α′κε2/2
≤ 2e−α′mε2/2 . (58)
19
Combining equations (57) and (58), we obtain
Pr

 1
S
∑
i∈T ′
yi ≤ 1
(1− α)m
∑
i∈T¯
yi − 2ε

 ≤ 2e−2α′mε2
+ e−2(1−α)κε
2
≤ 3e−2α′κε2 .
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